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The experienced lawyer knows that litigation tools, seemingly pointed like
arrows at the trial courtroom, most often find their mark in the resolution of
the dispute in negotiation. Skillful representation in developing a sound rela-
tionship with a client or in pleading, discovery and motion practice anticipates
the bargaining process and serves as a solid foundation for a beneficial com-
promise.' Yet very little is known of the skills lawyers employ in negotiation.
The private negotiation of disputes is most often an unseen operation."
Lawyers negotiate disputes in disparate areas of law. Whether one is ne-
gotiating plea bargains, corporate disputes or personal injury actions, an ubiq-
uitous process emerges: it is a process of the resolution of disputes or modifica-
tion of the legal status quo between disputants through compromising their
legal positions or exchanging some other social, economic or psychological in-
terest or value with the end of mutual benefit. Negotiation may be so basic as
to be a part of human nature. Generally, successful negotiation requires three
fundamental prerequisites: (1) the issue is negotiable-subject to compromise or
solution; (2) the negotiators are interested in giving as well as taking, so mean-
ingful exchange can occur, and (3) the negotiating parties trust one another to
some extent, even if only on the basic issue: compromise or the accommoda-
tion of interests may be beneficial to both parties.3
An understanding of timing and context, a knowledge of human behavior,
and a complete understanding of communication skills is essential for a skilled
negotiator. Respect for the value of thorough factual and legal preparation is
mandatory, together with familiarity with bargaining approaches and the at-
tributes of bargaining power and creativity.
Negotiation as a lawyer operation may test many, if not all, of the coin-
* Associate Professor of Law, Gonzaga University School of Law; B.A., 1964;
J.D., 1967, University of Minnesota.
1. Bargaining and negotiation are used interchangeably. In some discussions,
negotiation is viewed as a subprocess of bargaining. See, e.g., Gulliver, Case Studies of
Law in Non-Western Societies, in LAW, CULTURE AND SOCIETY 11, 18 (L. Nader ed.
1969).
2. See G, WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 15 (1983).
3. See Mathews, Negotiation: A Pedagogical Challenge, 6 J. LEGAL EDUC.
94, 95-97 (1953).
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mon operational skills" well-trained lawyers are presumed to possess. At a
minimum lawyer operational skills include:
1. Legal research.
a. Finding and managing law
b. Finding and managing the facts.
2. Use of legal reasoning, interpretation and use of language.
a. Organization and manipulation of abstract concepts through in-
ductive and deductive reasoning processes.
b. Writing, drafting and interpreting language.
c. Communication skill
i. Argument/persuasion as advocate.
ii. Development of attorney-client relationship and guidance as
counselor.
3. Decision-Making.
4. Managing the psychology of practice-interpersonal skills.6
The purpose of this article is to identify and explore the processes and
dynamics of lawyer negotiation at the skill level. Part I, Operational Skills in
Preparation for Negotiation, examines processes and subprocesses of negotia-
tion to develop a background for understanding the potential areas of lawyer
skill involved in the operation of negotiation in Section A. Section B explores
the preparation skills involved including the analysis and development of a
negotiation theory of the case which requires an understanding of the sub-
stance of the negotiation, norms, precedent and power combined with fact
management and effective characterization of the facts of the case. Section C
examines the comparative values of negotiation as an alternative dispute reso-
lution process prefatory to a discussion of skilled lawyer-client decision mak-
ing, collaboration and counseling in Section D. Part II examines operational
skills in a negotiation including communication skills in persuasion and rea-
soned arguments in Section A. Section B examines skilled use of language for
learning, the exchange of information, concessions and questioning in negotia-
tion. Management of the psychology of negotiation is assayed in Section C and
4. See Condlin, Socrates' New Clothes: Substituting Persuasion for Learning
in Clinical Practice Instruction, 40 MD. L. REV. 223, 228 n.1 1 (1981) (law school
instruction as educational methodology or subject matter should better articulate its
theory of lawyer operations); see also Probert & Brown, Theories and Practices in the
Legal Profession, 19 U. FLA. L. REV. 447, 458 (1966) (lawyers do not view lawyer
operations in practice, such as negotiation, as law related). It is unclear whether law-
yers and law schools, until recently, viewed such operations or activities as negotiation
as pieces of "patterned conduct" of lawyers involving anything other than intuition and
trial and error experience. But cf. Rutter, A Jurisprudence of Lawyers' Operations, 13
J. LEGAL EDUC. 301 (1961) (distinction between operations and skills).
5. Cf. SECTION ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, ABA,
LAWYER COMPETENCY: THE ROLE OF THE LAW SCHOOLS 9-10 (1979) (list of funda-
mental skills); Rutter, supra note 4, at 312-24 (same).
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Section D examines the issues in the ethics of negotiation. Section E looks at
drafting and other skills in the process of closure of the agreement.
I. PREPARATION FOR NEGOTIATION - OPERATIONAL SKILLS
A. The Nature of Negotiation Processes
Negotiation is the primary tool in determining legal controversies.6 While
some amount of intuitive skill is involved in the makeup of a good negotiator,
it is a necessity for the student of the art to recognize the processes and lawyer
competencies involved.
1. Subprocesses and Dilemmas
Negotiating most often is a process of exchanges,7 involving the aware-
ness of several underlying subprocesses. 8
In many negotiation settings the negotiators must recognize that they are
attempting to solve one another's problems to reach a just compromise. Nego-
tiation is a cooperative enterprise. This recognition lies at the root of the na-
ture of compromise-that by open and mutual seeking of solutions a result
will occur that will benefit all parties." Certain elements of the process should
be understood. A win or lose approach by either party generally exacerbates a
bargaining situation and reinforces the need of the other to "win." 1 A prob-
lem-solving process emphasizes those issues where both parties can gain from
6. G. WILLIAMS, ENGLAND, FARMER & BLUMENTHAL, EFFECTIVENESS IN LE-
GAL NEGOTIATION IN LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY: RESEARCH FRONTIERS (1976), quoted
in H. EDWARDS & J. WHITE, PROBLEMS, READINGS AND MATERIALS ON THE LAWYER
AS A NEGOTIATOR 8-28 (1977). The authors cite studies in the federal courts which
found that 91.6% of cases commenced were resolved without the necessity of trial.
Studies in state and local courts indicate that 70-90% of cases filed were resolved by
settlement. More recent studies do not significantly change these results. See G. WIL-
LIAMS, supra note 2, at 18.
7. R. FISHER & W. URY, GETTING TO YES 10-14 (1981). Because of difficul-
ties with the ethics and effectiveness of hard versus soft styles of negotiators and
problems inherent in traditional bargaining, the sequential taking and exchanging of
positions, negotiators should move beyond bargaining to a "problem-solving" approach.
8. See C. KARRASS, THE NEGOTIATING GAME 55-66, 127-45 (1970); R. WAL-
TON & R. MCKERSIE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LABOR NEGOTIATIONS 4-6 (1965).
9. This approach to negotiation has been labeled "integrative bargaining," as
opposed to "distributive bargaining" in which parties are bargaining over a finite share
of a total sum or resource. C. KARRASS, supra note 8, at 127; R. WALTON & R. McK-
ERSIE, supra note 8, at 4-5.
10. C. KARRASS, supra note 8, at 128; see Aubert, Competition and Dissensus:
Two Types of Conflict and of Conflict Resolution, 7 J. CONFL. REs. 26, 26-28 (1963).
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agreement by cooperation rather than competition." The "problem-solving"
attitude may avoid the zero sum"2 game that is generally involved in share
bargaining. The questions should be: Is there a way to settle this case so that
everyone gains? Are there solutions available that will satisfy the disputants'
interests and needs without elevating the potential for competition?
The nature of litigation often forces positions on lawyers through the
strategies necessary to secure a party's goals. Dollar values are assigned to the
parties' interests and lawyers frequently bargain over a share of a total sum.
Every dollar one party wins the other loses.1" One party may be demanding a
result that is completely inconsistent with the other party's interests. The outer
limit of share bargaining is exemplified by child custody contests which may
often be a clear "either/or" situation, foreclosing bargaining. Because each
party wants the child, one of the prerequisites for bargaining is absent: there
can be no mutual benefit.14 Share bargaining offers the potential of a high
degree of competition and conflict. The goals of the lawyer-negotiator are to
resolve the conflicts and exchanges to his/her client's advantage or redefine a
win/lose situation by a creative characterization of the issues involved so that
a negotiated solution is possible. Suppose in a custody case it is discovered that
the adverse party is seeking custody because of a belief that one's client is not
providing necessary medical care. An alternative characterization of the real
issue or the unearthing of the basic interest lying under the position may
transform a non-negotiable custody setting into a fruitful situation for resolu-
tion on the issue of the appropriate level of medical care. 5
The negotiator is constantly reconciling his goals and attitudes with the
aims and instructions of the client. 6 The negotiator's question may be: How
far can I go in advocating and seeking a bargaining result that is inconsistent
with my personal values? Must I advance all of my client's demands, even
those that are unreasonable? This phenomenon must be understood and re-
solved or it may detract from the larger bargaining setting. A key issue is
often the lawyer's view of the lawyer-client relationship.
Connected with personal bargaining is the phenomenon of client bargain-
ing. A lawyer often negotiates with the client about the client's expectations.
For example, the lawyer may seek for good reason or bad to reduce his client's
expectation level so that when the bargaining is completed, the negotiator will
11. C. KARRASS, supra note 8, at 128-130.
12. The zero sum comes from the balance of the "winner's" gains against the
"loser's" losses. See Morgenstern, Game Theory, in 6 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA Soc. ScI.
62, 62-65 (1968).
13. Id.
14. See supra text accompanying note 3.
15. See K. HEGLAND, TRIAL AND PRACTICE SKILLS IN A NUTSHELL 279-86
(1978); Fisher, Fractionating Conflict, 93 DAEDALUS 920, 926-28 (1964).
16. See Mayesh, Counseling the Client-Assessing the Risks and Benefits of
Litigation, 2 PREVENTIVE L. REP. 107 (1984); text accompanying note 214 infra.
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have achieved a negotiating goal: a goal that was low from the beginning.17
This subprocess that goes on in lawsuit negotiation has serious implications for
the necessary phenomenon of collaboration between lawyer and client and the
ethics of bargaining. 8
Negotiation occurs about the interpersonal approach the bargainers take
to one another. Attitudes have to be modified sufficiently to allow a problem-
solving process and the mutually beneficial exchange of information. Five atti-
tudinal relationships can exist in bargaining circumstances: (1) extreme ag-
gression; (2) mild aggression for deterrent purposes to avoid a weak point; (3)
mutual accommodation; (4) open cooperation; and (5) direct collusion with
the opponent."
A negotiator must decide which of these relationships is appropriate from
a strategic and ethical standpoint. Bargaining concerning the negotiator's rela-
tionship goes on in every negotiation.2
Recent insightful literature exploring processes of principled vs. posi-
tional" negotiation, cooperative vs. competitive2" lawyer interactions and dis-
pute or norm-centered negotiation vs. rule-making or strategic negotiation2"
17. This approach is apparently widespread in personal injury practice, at least
on the anecdotal level, "low balling" the client. It is an ethically dubious practice.
18. See Part II(D)(7) infra.
19. C. Karrass, supra note 8, at 131.
20. Id.
21. See generally R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 7. The Harvard Negotia-
tion Project has developed a theory of successful and principled dispute resolution that
has five elements. From the beginning to the end of any negotiation, both parties work
toward knowing their best alternative to the negotiated agreement. The substance of
the dispute is separated from the relationship between the parties so that each party
can be cordial to the other but bargain thoroughly on the issues. Objective criteria are
sought that aid this process and that lead to agreement on principles. The focus is on
interests, not on the taking of positions. Finally, invention of mutually advantageous
options can contribute to successful negotiation of an agreement.
22. See generally G. WILLIAMS, supra note 2. In a comprehensive study of law-
yers' characteristics while negotiating, Williams found that "cooperatives" were rated
more effective negotiators that "competitives." Both types of "effectives were perceived
as highly experienced, ethical, trustworthy and honest. They were realistic, controlled,
rational, analytical and thoroughly prepared on the facts and law, but they were crea-
tive, adaptable and perceptive in reading their opponent's cues as well as skillful in
affirmatively learning from them. They understood their cases and their opponent's
case and strategy."
23. See generally Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute
Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637 (1976). Eisenberg has suggested
that negotiations occur with an awareness that, if an agreement is not reached pri-
vately, then an unknown and potentially "winner take all" decision will be made by a
stranger, the judge, in an adjudication of the dispute by a court of law. The alternative
to this decision is private ordering, where the parties settle disputes that have arisen
from past behavior and, attempt to regulate future behavior by creating mutually
1984]
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provides a useful foundation for an understanding of negotiating processes and
lawyer skills in lawsuit negotiation.
Dichotomous categories are extremely useful for analysis," but they are
sometimes troublesome in practical application. Lawyer negotiation often in-
volves balancing tensions between problem-solving and positioning, cooperation
and competition, reasoned normative argument and blatant emotional plea."
The difference between a good negotiator and a poor negotiator is skilled sen-
sitivity in determining what approach to take in the given situation that the
lawyer is facing26 and how to effectively handle the series of dilemmas that
negotiators face. Virtually every bargaining setting presents the opportunity to
creatively resolve shared interests and to bargain over competing goals.2 7 In
every negotiation there are cooperative and competitive elements. A coopera-
tive element exists when negotiators believe that they will gain more by negoti-
ating than by not negotiating. A competitive element exists when both negotia-
tors have conflicting preferences or contending interests that may be difficult
to reconcile. In any range of possible agreements the push for a solution more
favorable to one side than the other will always trigger competition. When
negotiators commit themselves to attempt to agree, each is dependent on the
other for the result. All negotiation is aimed at achieving certain results, but
those results are only possible if the other negotiator agrees to them. This
situation is sometimes described as "result" or "outcome" dependence.2 8 This
dependence creates a goal dilemma. Each negotiator in a distributive share
dispute wants an agreement as favorable to his client as possible, a result that
is arguably mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility, 29 but for a
negotiator to attempt to maximize his position may result in such a dubious
proposed agreement for the other side that a stalemate is inevitable. 0 On the
other hand for one negotiator to abdicate this responsibility in his or her desire
agreed upon rules that take the form of a legally enforceable contract. The general
theory of the efficacy of private ordering is that compliance with the terms of a settle-
ment increases with the voice that parties have in reaching the agreement. Private or-
dering also allows solutions to be better tailored to the needs of disputants and those
solutions tend to be in fact more "principled."
24. See Heilbroner, The Dialectical Vision, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 1980, at 25-
26.
25. D. FISHER, WHAT EVERY LAWYER KNOWS 84-85 (1975).
26. See D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT-WHO'S IN CHARGE? 109-10
(1974); cf. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 28-29. Both authors recognize that flexibility
is a characteristic that is mandatory for a competent negotiator.
27. See R. WALTON & R. McKERSIE, supra note 8, at 18.
28. D. JOHNSON & F. JOHNSON, JOINING TOGETHER 297 (1982).
29. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A)(1)-(3)
(1979).
30. See, e.g. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 73. See generally C. OSGOOD, AN
ALTERNATIVE TO WAR OR SURRENDER (1962) (all or nothing, maximalist strategy
very often results in stalemate).
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to maximize a client's realistic goal invites untenable advantage to the other,
in the absence of a matrix of alternatives that could yield maximum advan-
tage to both parties."
Each negotiator, armed with authority and input from the client, seeks an
agreement that is the best that can be done in the face of the other's resistance
or opposition. Since there is rarely an obvious or inevitable "right" result, each
negotiator must decide before the negotiation begins, and sometimes during
the negotiation, what a reasonably optimal solution should be for one's client
and for the other party and its lawyer.8 2
Another characteristic of the negotiation process is that the negotiators
are dependent upon each other in most cases, not only for the negotiated result
but also for information about a possible solution .3
Information can be secured in one of two ways: each negotiator can
openly and honestly share preferences, needs and expectations or each can at-
tempt to hide, conceal or manipulate them in the hope of maximizing the out-
come for the client. The dilemma is whether to trust. There is almost a schizo-
phrenic aspect to this negotiator's dilemma. Often a negotiator cannot know
what outcome he should seek or what his expectations should be until he
learns through the negotiations process what the other negotiator's expecta-
tions seem to be."4
The complexity and danger of the dilemma of trust creates the tension
between competitive/positional and cooperative/problem-solving negotiation.
The problem solver/cooperative has presumed that the rewards of openness
and trust are worth the risk; the competitive bargainer has presumed the oppo-
site. The competitive bargainer's failure to trust creates high risks of stale-
mate, the problem solver's trust, if not carefully controlled, may create a risk
of exploitation.35
2. Processual Models
In time-pressured labor management bargaining the process of negotia-
tion follows three phases: Phase I, in which the negotiators behave in a very
31. See generally Harnett, Cummings & Hamner, Personality, Bargaining
Style and Payoff in Bilateral Monopoly Bargaining Among European Managers, 36
SOCIOMETRY 325 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Harnett].
32. See Part I(E)(2), infra. See generally S. SEIGEL & L. FOURAKER, BAR-
GAINING AND GROUP DECISION MAKING (1960). In H. RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCI-
ENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982), a set of seller's negotiators were told not to attempt to
get as much in a share bargain because of the desirability of later amicable relation-
ships with the other side. In other words "don't maximize-let them win a little." The
sellers did better than they usually did maximizing. Id. at 58.
33. See P. GULLIVER, DISPUTES AND NEGOTIATIONS, A CROSS CULTURAL PRO-
SPECTIVE 20-29 (1979).
34. Id.
35. See Harnett, supra note 31, at 342.
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aggressive non-conciliatory fashion and stake out hard-nosed positions through
oratorical fireworks. Phase II is a "hard-bargaining" phase in which the par-
ties carefully examine one another's positions, seek areas of potential compro-
mise, and listen for concessions or retreat. The parties attempt manipulation
through extensive use of techniques and tactics. Phase III is a crisis phase in
which deadlines approach. The parties abandon sham postures and take more
realistic positions. Client bargaining takes place as negotiators return to their
clients or constituents and bargain over client aspirations. As the deadline ap-
proaches, substantial bargaining occurs with alternatives posed at a dizzying
rate. Skilled bargainers invariably take advantage of the less-skilled or ill-pre-
pared during this phase.86
From his survey of negotiation literature, Gerald R. Williams describes a
similar process and identifies four "stages" in legal negotiation: (1) orientation
and positioning, (2) argumentation, (3) emergence and crisis and (4) agree-
ment or final breakdown. 7
In the first stage the negotiators begin to deal with one another and estab-
lish negotiating approaches and attitudes that will affect the overall negotia-
tion." They may stake out their positions, which vary substantially depending
on strategic8 9 and client considerations. A negotiator may adopt a maximalist
strategy of asking for more than she or he expects to obtain, an equitable
strategy of taking a position that is fair to both sides, or an integrative strat-
egy which seeks to develop alternative solutions to find the most attractive
combination for all concerned.'
If a position is taken, commitment to that position is part of the strategy
to create credibility and lower the adversarys' expectations. The power of that
commitment is directly dependent, as in the argumentation stage, on the
strength of norms, principles and precedent."1
The stage two argumentation replicates many of the argumentation
processes with which lawyers are familiar. Information is exchanged, evalu-
ated and critiqued; the case issues emerge and some concessions are ex-
changed. Stages three and four trace the development of consensus through
time pressures, concessions and closure or stalemate. Crucial to closure of an
agreement is the lawyer's drafting ability in solidifying and memorializing the
36. See generally A. DOUGLASS, INDUSTRIAL PEACEMAKING (1962).
37. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 70-85.
38. Id. at 72.
39. The term "strategy" as used by Williams and most writers appears to be
taken from T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 3 n.1 (1960) ("The term
'strategy' is intended to focus on the interdependence of the adversaries' decisions on
their expectations about each other's behavior. .. ").
40. Ramberg, Tactical Advantages of Opening Positioning Strategies, in G.
WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 73.
41. Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 639.
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Philip Gulliver, in his most recent study of negotiation, "' and Walton and
McKersie" in the labor management arena postulate analogous "stages" in
the negotiation process and the flow of information between negotiators. Gul-
liver describes two simultaneous interrelated processes in negotiation: a repeti-
tive exchange of information that moves the negotiation through developmen-
tal stages from the beginning of the negotiation to its conclusion.4 The
information exchange perceived by Gulliver and others is a process of ex-
changed persuasion and learning about preferences and expectations that may
reinforce the negotiator's existing preferences and positions or may require
changes, depending upon the impact of the information.
Gulliver's developmental stages are similar to those described by Wil-
liams"6 but marked by swings from "coordinating" to "antagonistic" negotiat-
42. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 81-85.
43. See generally P. GULLIVER, supra note 33.
44. See generally R. WALTON & R. MCKERSIE, supra note 8.
45. See P. GULLIVER, supra note 33, at 81-84; see also Haynes, The Process of
Negotiations, 1 MEDIATION Q. 75 (1983) (Haynes uses Gulliver's cyclical model to
dissect a family dispute). Gulliver describes the cyclical and developmental process:
A simple analogy is a moving automobile. There is the cyclical turning of the
wheels (linked to the cyclical action of the valves, pistons, etc.) . . . that en-
ables the vehicle to move, and there is the actual movement of the vehicle
from one place to another. The latter process depends on the former but the
raison d'etre of the automobile is its spacial movement. In negotiation, some-
what similarly, there is a cyclical process comprising the repetitive exchange
of information between the parties, its assessment, and the resulting adjust-
ment of expectation and preferences; there is also a developmental process
involved in the movement from the initiation of the dispute-its conclusion-
some outcome-and its implementation. . . . Briefly, the pattern of repetitive
exchange (the cyclical process) is that, in turn, each party receives informa-
tion of various kind from the other and in response offers information to him.
There is, however, more than merely communication. There is cognition and
learning. Received information is interpreted and evaluated by a party and
added to what he already knows or thinks he knows. Thus a party may be
able to learn more about his own expectations and preferences, about those of
his opponents, and about their common situation and possible outcomes.
Learning may induce changes in the parties' preference and set his strategies
or it may reinforce his existing position. Learning may raise the need for more
information from the opponent and/or the need to give futher information to
him so that he may be induced to learn and therefore be persuaded to shift
his position to something more favorable to the party. Depending on the kind
of learning the party makes the tactical choice concerning the purpose and
content of his next message which is then proffered to his opponent. In turn,
the other party goes through the same procedure and then offers his informa-
tion to the first party. . . and so on. Thus, one might say the wheels turn and
the vehicle moves. P. GULLIVER, supra, note 33, at 81-84.
46. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 70-85.
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ing approaches depending on the issues and the stage of negotiation.4 The
management of the psychology of the bargaining is important in reaching
shared solutions rather than stalemate.
Walton and McKersie describe a three-phase process in which negotiators
first identify the case issues in dispute through the exchange of information;
second, locate and explore alternative solutions and third, find the best result
and agree to it. The negotiator in phase one presents issues and information in
the light most favorable to his client and carefully edits and selects the infor-
mation the opponent will hear. In phase two and three, a more open and crea-
tive approach is developed to initiate, explore and persuade regarding the mu-
tually profitable results available.4 8
An examination of these negotiation processes, an understanding of the
place of rule, principle and precedent in negotiation49 and an evaluation of
recent material on perceived lawyer effectiveness5" suggest that effective nego-
tiation is not one "skill" but a lawyer operation51 depending upon a congerie of
common lawyer skills that can be extracted from the bargaining process and
analyzed to some degree.
B. A Negotiation Theory of the Case-Managing the Law and Facts,
Power, Precedent and Other Norms
1. Theory of the Case-Doctrinal Analysis
The approach of the practicing lawyer to negotiation is immersed in the-
ory, although he or she may view it as practical and deny its theoretical as-
pects. "A person cannot act without theory. He could not walk, read or drive
an automobile without generalizations in living habits and assumptions to
make it reasonable to pursue the value of each goal-directed act. Once you
start using words, you generalize and theorize."52
Whether or not it is articulated, lawyers operate on a theoretical basis
when formulating arguments and reasoning from precedent and other norma-
tive standards. Lawyers mesh the world of facts, precedents and norms. At its
most abstract, a theory is a generalized description of things or events. Law-
yers theorize in order to facilitate the development of rules to explain the simi-
47. See Aubert, supra note 10, at 26-42; cf. Macaulay, Non-Contractual Rela-
tions in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55 (1963) (The authors
document cooperative and antagonistic bargaining behavior by negotiators depending
on the nature of the issue discussed).
48. See generally R. WALTON & R. McKERsIE, supra note 8.
49. Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 649-53.
50. See G. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 24-30.
51. See Probert & Brown, supra note 4, at 449-54; Rutter, supra note 4, at
305-06.
52. Probert & Brown, supra note 4, at 450.
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larities of the functioning of the subject matter in the theory. They are trained
in the study of legal doctrine in the familiar process of synthesizing, analyzing,
distinguishing and reconciling cases with the underlying inductive and deduc-
tive generalization processes that accompanies the theoretical development of
rules.
On the practical level, a negotiating theory of the case is a set of loose
generalizations that are on one hand, the lawyer's plan of action, and on the
other, the "best face" perspective on the case.
The negotiating theory of the case will usually be a generalization based
on reasoning from the factual material in the case. A deductive argument or
inference follows the syllogistic form: Persons related by blood to a party are
biased in their testimony. (Major premise.) "X is related by blood to a party."
(Minor premise.) "Therefore, X is biased in his testimony." (Conclusion.)
Sometimes the theory may be partly inductive. The inductive form of infer-
ence is this: "This witness is related by blood to a party." (Thesis.) "There-
fore, he is biased in his testimony." (Conclusion). The distinctions are impor-
tant between the two types of reasoning. The inductive or empirical process is
based on experience and allows for other explanations of possible inferences or
results. The deductive process virtually eliminates other explanations and
points unerringly to the conclusion sought.
The negotiating theory of the case should be a deductive or inductive gen-
eralization in which the lawyer has carefully thought out and eliminated virtu-
ally every other factual inference that may be available to the other negotiator
to explain away the force of the theory. The theory should also be a deductive
or inductive generalization from the facts which addresses the question of why
the client should receive a certain result in the negotiation.53 An example of a
negotiating theory to characterize a medical malpractice case from the defen-
dant's standpoint might be: Healer having followed all approved procedures is
attacked by an ungrateful patient."
Thus, a negotiating theory of the case is a generalization, a characteriza-
tion and a plan of action.
The theory should be based on a firm foundation of facts and fair infer-
ences from those facts. The facts that primarily support the theory should be
very strong in that they should be undisputed or uncontestable-clearly admis-
sible documents, excellent photographs, admissions, independent witnesses,
clear scientific facts and the like. While there may be a realm of factual ambi-
guities or contingencies involved in the negotiation of facts (those facts that
can be objectively determined later or conditionally assumed for purposes of
settlement), the ultimate settlement is going to rely upon hard and verifiable
facts. The theory of the case should have those highly reliable facts as a foun-
53. Cf G. VETTER, SUCCESSFUL CIVIL LITIGATION 21-33 (1977) (importance
of developing a theory of the case for civil trial strategy).
54. Id. at 27.
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dation. The theory should not be inconsistent with other reliable facts and
should have a common sense appeal.
In each case there are several ways to characterize or describe what is at
stake in the negotiation. The negotiating theory of the case should be as broad
and solid a statement as possible without engaging in wishful thinking about
any part of the case.5 5 An effective development of the negotiating theory of
the case lends organization and allows conceptualization of the issues in the
negotiation. For example:
The client-farmer purchased a "lemon" tractor whose defects became mani-
fest during the farmer's use of the tractor. The motor of the tractor seized
and the client-farmer was thrown to the ground. The farmer was injured and
the tractor no longer works. The client-farmer refuses to pay any amount for
the tractor. He was purchasing it from the dealer on installments. During the
purchase of the tractor, certain express warranties were made to the client-
farmer in addition to the implied warranties existing in such a sale.
There are a number of generalized characterizations of this case:
1. "Client is disputing with the tractor salesman as to what was said
and has protection under the law of sales." This theory statement is quite
narrow and minimizes the legal protections conferred upon buyers under basic
statutory schemes. The issue becomes: Whom do you believe?
2. "Client-farmer has been physically injured and deceived by the cyni-
cal use of representations combined with warranty disclaimers and has been
exploited by the defendant through illegal collection practices." This statement
illustrates that for the farmer the broader the generalized characterization of
the negotiating theory, the more favorable are the issues to discuss. The poten-
tial effect on other consumers of such conduct; the question of broad, deceptive
practices; the use of adhesive-type provisions in the contract; the effect of mis-
representations which ultimately lead to the loss of the benefit of the bargain
as well as personal injury. Each of these become topics of negotiation
discussion.
Implicit in any statement of a negotiating theory of the case are statutory
policies, case law doctrines and normative propositions seen in their opera-
tional context. Whether articulated or intuitive, the formulation of the negoti-
ating theory of the case has to be an exercise in the lawyer's ability to use the
language to abstract from a single event, fact or circumstance, the generalized
doctrinal, normative and equitable position for the client in the negotiating
setting. Even in a discussion of only a part of the negotiation operation, one
can see that at the foundation of the exercise of virtually every professional
operation of the lawyer lie a number of crucial interrelated skills."
55. Id. at 31.
56. See Rutter, supra note 4, at 319; text accompanying note 5 supra.
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2. Managing the Facts
The lawyer's ability to order the facts and events in the process of prob-
lem-solving may be the primary operating skill.
5 7
In preparation for negotiation, the lawyer divides his approach to the
facts into three areas: (1) hypothecating facts, (2) discovering facts, and (3)
presenting facts.' 8
(1) Hypothecating facts. In developing a negotiating theory of the case
lawyers reason from the particular specific events or facts to a conclusion in
order to develop a convenient handle or characterization for a negotiating pos-
ture in the case. In hypothecating facts the lawyer reverses this process by
reasoning from the desired conclusions, theory or hypothesis to the probable
57. See Rutter, supra note 4, at 316. Rutter has described the lawyer's fact
management task as follows:
When I speak of "fact management," in necessarily rather abstract
terms at this point, I go far beyond the multiple-distilled and sharply con-
toured facts as they appear in appellate opinions and as they may be used in
formulating doctrinal positions. In the chaos of experience confronting the
lawyer at the operating level, facts do not appear with the subject-headings
and elaborate subdivisions of a key number system. The lawyer's skills in or-
dering and molding involves a process of total immersion in the grubby minu-
tiae of undifferentiated factual chaos and a circumferential sensitivity to facts
radiating out in all directions, to be seen and heard buzzing around the ears,
as well as those in front of the nose.
This is not achieved by crossing off items on a check-list nor by settling
for the fuzzy images of the impressionist. It demands rather the concrete visu-
alization of facts and events in all their microscopic detail, seen imaginatively,
and at the same time through the sharply focused lens of photographic real-
ity. In ordering the chaos, the lawyer proceeds by discovering the relation-
ships between initially unrelated segments of the picture and then placing
these relationships in their future relationship to a total reality, so far as it
can be seen. For the lawyer, factual interrelationship includes the bearing of
all applicable law. In a sense, the law becomes part of the total mass of facts,
albeit a special kind of facts.
Id. at 316-17.
58. Id. at 331. Rutter has proposed sequential steps of facts in the lawyer's
operations: a fact ladder. (1) The highest rung involves appellate facts as they appear
in appellate opinions. (2) One rung down are facts found by the trial court. These facts
may be similar to appellate facts but often are not articulated and are only found by
inference in a jury verdict. (3) Litigative facts are proofs submitted by the lawyer
represented by sworn testimony and exhibits culled and screened by the law of evi-
dence. (4) Pre-litigative facts are the source of litigative facts, that is products of inves-
tigation, interviews with witnesses, documents, photographs, models, hospital records,
technical scientific facts, and scientific material. (5) Non-litigative facts are the mass
of factual material discovered by the lawyer most of which never get into court. (6)
Original facts are original events from which all of the others start. All of the others
are essentially assertions or propositions about the original facts. Id. at 331.
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facts that are supportive of the conclusion and pursues lines of inquiry based
on these predicted facts. After doing some legal research, interviewing the cli-
ent and completing some investigating, the lawyer will develop a working hy-
pothesis as to what happened in the case which will point him in the direction
of more facts which need to be developed and discovered. In this part of the
fact management operation, the lawyer is using his reasoning skill to tell him
where to look and what to look for, much like a physical scientist postulating
the existence of subatomic bodies. He moves from conclusions and inferences
to the data that would support the inferences. He asks himself, "if my theory
is true-what else would be true?" This same process is engaged to anticipate
and predict the opponent's theory.
The lawyer hypothecates the potential facts that support the adverse the-
ory partly from allegations in the pleadings and partly from hypothecation.
The operation points to facts that the lawyer hopes are not there. In either
case, if the facts necessary to the theory of the case or any subhypothesis do
not exist, the lawyer has to revise the hypothesis, go back to the client for
additional information, or find ways to discredit or undermine the negative
facts.
(2) Fact Discovery. The operative factors involved in discovery and de-
veloping investigative or "pre-litigative facts"59 is the subject of much discus-
sion in lawyer skills literature."
(3) Presenting Facts in Negotiation. The issue of what facts to present
in bargaining can be a complex one. The nature of the fact hierarchy devel-
oped in negotiations ranges from undetermined facts to unequivocably agreed
upon facts between the negotiators. The lawyer's skills are well spent prioritiz-
ing the categories of facts based on the relevance of those facts as a function
of their necessity to a settlement agreement.
Such an hierarchy might be: (1) agreed facts necessary for settlement and
facts of common knowledge that are without question indispensible to an
agreement; (2) hard facts or "high card" facts that are disputed: these dis-
puted facts are substantially uncontestable because they are based on admis-
sions, clear answers to interrogatories, admissible authentic documents, photo-
graphs, undisputed scientific fact or opinion, or facts from independent and
unimpeachable witnesses; (3) disputed admissible facts supported by witnesses
and subject to persuasive objective verification; (4) disputed admissible facts
supported by partisan witnesses but not subject to persuasive objective verifica-
tion; (5) ambiguous proof and facts from a party upon which there is no
corroboration.
How any hierarchy of fact is presented and used in negotiation will vary
widely in disputes. It is often suggested that some disputed or unknown facts
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., R. SIMMONS, WINNING BEFORE TRIAL: HOW TO PREPARE CASES
FOR THE BEST SETTLEMENT OR TRIAL RESULT 408-12 (1974).
[Vol. 1984
14
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1984, Iss.  [1984], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1984/iss/11
SKILLS IN NEGOTIATION
can be assumed for provisional purposes in an attempt to develop solutions
based on the assumed truth of those facts. 1 Settlements generally turn on
facts at the high rungs of the probative hierarchy: those facts comprising cate-
gories one and two above. The acceptance of facts from any category in the
hierarchy in negotiation is much more likely than in litigation.
2
In managing this hierarchy of facts, lawyer negotiators present their se-
lected versions of the facts to one another knowing which outcomes are likely
to result from their own selected versions. In effect, what happens in the nego-
tiating process is that the competing factual versions are somehow rephrased,
bypassed, ignored or otherwise accommodated until a version develops that
allows for compromise." In combining these "managed facts" with basic equi-
ties and legal norms, a negotiating theory of the case helps to narrow and fix
the objects of the dispute by defining both factually and doctrinally what is to
be decided in the negotiation. While an emphasis on legal doctrine helps to
define the normative framework of the dispute, the absence of a focus on the
client's equities can ignore potential "person-oriented" norms and equities that
are the sources of much fruitful compromise in negotiation."
3. Precedent, Norms and Other Power
Central to several of a lawyer's operational skills is the ability to manipu-
late abstractions with the use and interpretation of language." Lawyers in
negotiation and in most everything they do bridge the gap between facts based
on direct observation and immediate experience to intentionally abstract and
completely generalized normative rules." The availability and skillful use of
alternative language through increasingly generalized statements to describe a
factual situation when applying precedent and doctrine is basic to the lawyer's
ability to interpret norms and rules. The understanding of rule formulation
which, as expressed in a "case," generalizes a fact situation, and not necessa-
rily the facts of that case, is a basic part of a lawyer's abstracting skill.
The management of "legal norms" is more than the application of rules
to diverse factual situations. It is a discipline that allows the discovery of rules
in the process of determining similarity or differences between cases. In man-
aging precedent negotiators present to one another competing examples, gener-
61. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 657.
62. Id. at 658.
63. See J. COLLIER, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN ZINACANTAN 96 (1973),
cited in Mather & Yngvesson, Language, Audience, and the Transformation of Dis-
putes, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 775, 777 (1981) (similar phenomena in process of
mediation).
64. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305. 328-
30 (1971).
65. See Rutter, supra note 4, at 318-24; text accompanying note 5 supra.
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alizations, analogies or legal appraisals. Just as in the competing factual evalu-
ations, the negotiators ultimately choose the appropriate analogies, examples
or generalizations and ignore or rephrase them in order to accommodate the
compromise process.67
The competing definitions of a dispute articulated by each negotiator or-
der facts and invoke norms in particular and predictable ways that generally
reflect the personal interests and values of the respective clients. Although em-
pirically we know very little about what goes on in the patterned conduct of
negotiation, we know from simulated examples68 that negotiators construct a
"paradigm of argument" which paints a picture of relevant events and actions
in terms of a factual hierarchy of importance, terms of implicit or explicit
normative principles which are rule based, client based, community based or
power based.69
In the negotiation of disputes the process of elaborating various normative
referents encompasses all of the principles mentioned above and more. Many
of the client, community or power based norms would be invalid, irrelevant, or
ignored by a court."0
Most negotiations involve parties that have some joint interests even
though they may not have a continuing relationship. Elements of the bargain-
ing will involve "claim of right"7 1 arguments based on rule and precedent;
either informal, party-oriented or legal and normative arguments, which in-
volve societal, religious, equitable and individual values. A negotiator's skill is
effectively utilized working to affect an adverse party's perception of the re-
spective panoply of norms, principles, equities, benefits and bargaining power
in order to influence the adverse party's weighing process and his choice of the
settlement alternative against the risks of litigation. A successful result may
ultimately depend upon appearances of reality: bargaining leverage and per-
suading the other negotiator to embrace one's definition of principle, reality
and priority of norms.
An understanding of all the participants' needs and goals and the balance
of real and perceived effective power between negotiating parties are compo-
nents of negotiating skill. The recognition of relevant and existing norms be-
tween the parties through the equities of the case is a key issue in preparing
for negotiation.
One normative referent involves the concept of legitimacy: those matters
67. See E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 225 (1979).
68. See the transcripts of two negotiations that were simulated by experienced
lawyers in G. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, app. at 149-91.
69. See Mather & Yngvesson, supra note 63, at 780-81.
70. See Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 643-45 (description of conflicting, colliding
and person-oriented norms which form a legitimate body of principle together with
precedent that is effectively used in negotiation).
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that are so overwhelmingly true and good that they cannot be argued about, a
source of normative power that appeals to cultural values that are beyond dis-
pute. The right of a seller in a capitalistic system to make a profit is an exam-
ple of a principle with legitimacy and substantial normative power.
The idea of principles, moral or ethical norms at stake that require vindi-
cation through the client and through the client's lawsuit, also creates norma-
tive power. The value inherent in the principle may represent a favored
class-for example, consumers. An example of stating a normative principle
would be: "The courts are going to recognize the notion that negotiation of a
term in a contract is the key to the validity and acceptance of any contract
term. The fundamental issue is that the consumer understands what he has
agreed to."
Commitment to a cause or client may be an effective normative vehicle."2
All of the "should" arguments are involved in negotiation when lawyers dis-
cuss the "equities" of their cases-the nature (right or wrong) of the client's
acts and the personal characteristics (good or bad) of their clients.7
In many bargaining settings in which the issues and disputes are sharply
defined by written pleadings, a powerful defendant may not have any incentive
to negotiate because bargaining may be an ineffective utilization of its power.
Institutional or corporate defendants have a natural advantage in the litigation
process because by its nature it is time consuming, delay oriented and expen-
sive. Such defendants have a superior "capacity" in litigation because of their
experience with it.
74
An appraisal of the balance of power is often carefully unstated in negoti-
ations. Parties and their representatives often operate under the fiction of
equal bargaining power, but they understand implicitly the power realities of
the contest. While the legal acceptability of the facts, norms, and precedents
elaborated in the negotiations are key elements in the balance of power, other
power issues often surface. Detailed knowledge of the facts and command of
other information is going to affect the other party's perception of the power
balance and influence his or her behavior. Many lawyers evaluate their cases
by looking to basic economic truths of law practice. Often the lawyer's loyalty
and commitment to the case is determined by the client's advance payment or
overall ability to pay. A fee arrangement or institutional situation that gives
72. See C. KARRASS, supra note 8, at 61.
73. See Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 643 (role of act-oriented norms in dispute
resolution).
74. See Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Lim-
its of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'y REv. 96, 107-14 (1974); Wanner, The Public
Ordering of Private Relations, Part Two: Winning Civil Court Cases, 9 LAW & Soc'Y
REV. 293, 305-06 (1975). Galanter demonstrates the natural advantages organizational
defendants should have. Wanner, from data on cases litigated in three large cities,
demonstrates that organizations are generally more successful than individual litigants.
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an economic advantage in terms of the availability of the lawyer to work on
the case will affect the power balance in the negotiation.
71
One side may have pressing financial reasons that point toward settle-
ment. One side may be financially distraught to the point that bankruptcy is
inevitable. A client may be ultimately "judgment proof." The elimination of a
source for collection of a judgment or the likelihood that if a judgment is
achieved it would be discharged, are powerful incentives to settlement. On the
other hand, the economic power of large institutional clients is always a source
of negotiating power.
In many cases, the prospect of going to trial carries with it the likelihood
of publicity from the media and sometimes pressure from the public. While
lawyers have a basic ethical responsibility concerning publicizing their cases,
publicity about a case may have an adverse psychological effect on one side or
the other. Business organizations and individuals react in response to public
pressure and peer pressure. 76 Publicity may irrevocably characterize the con-
flict detrimentally. Publicity may fossilize otherwise fluid positions in the nego-
tiations because of fear on the part of parties of public loss of face.
Any negotiation may combine in its elements the existential particularity
of the concrete facts, client equities developed from those facts, community
interest norms that may develop from future application of a litigated result,
the use of precedent and the analysis of power.7
4. The Substance of the Negotiation
The lawyer's negotiation theory of the case has to be based on an analysis
of the real issues in the negotiation. Issues that are set for negotiation are
often the express representatives of inarticulated needs, expectations, aspira-
tions and interests of the disputants. An understanding of the real needs and
interests in every negotiation may enable the negotiator to analyze what covert
aspirations exist on either side of the negotiating table and aid in adapting
alternative methods of dealing with the adverse party's expectations and overt
issues.
Dr. Chester Karrass presents a simple theory of expected-satisfaction that
serves to illustrate well some basic issues in two-party negotiation.
The expected-satisfaction theory may be summarized in terms of seven basic
propositions:
Proposition 1: Negotiation is not simply a good deal for both parties.
While each must gain something, it is improbable that they will gain equally.
75. See Johnson, Lawyers' Choice: A Theoretical Appraisal of Litigation In-
vestment Decisions, 15 LAW & Soc'y REV. 567, 569-601 (1981).
76. See, e.g., R. WALTON & R. McKERSIE, supra note 8, at 392-98, 402-03,
405-06; Mather & Yngvesson, supra note 63, at 778-80.
77. See generally Coons, Approaches to Court Imposed Compromise-The
Uses of Doubt and Reason, 58 Nw. U.L. REV. 750 (1964).
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Proposition 2: No two value systems are likely to be the same . . . men
have more or less the same needs but achieve different degrees of satisfaction
from reaching goals.
Proposition 3: In every negotiation the potential exists for the parties to
maximize their joint satisfaction at no loss to either. The more intense the
search for joint improvement the more likely people will be to find superior
solutions. This process of joint improvement is called problem-solving
bargaining.
Proposition 4: In every negotiation there is a point reached at which the
gains of one party are won at the loss of the other. This process of rationing is
called share bargaining.
Proposition 5: All transactions are based on future expectations of satis-
faction. No two men are likely to estimate future satisfactions in the same
way.
Proposition 6: In the last analysis it is not goods, money or services that
people exchange in the process of negotiation but satisfaction. Material things
represent only the more visible aspects of a transaction.
Proposition 7: A negotiator can only make assumptions about an oppo-
nent's satisfactions, expectations and goals. One important purpose of negotia-
tion is to test these assumptions. The opponent's real intentions can only be
discovered by a process of vigorous probing because he himself may be only
dimly aware of them.78
The substance of much negotiation is satisfaction of the parties' needs
and interests that underlie a demand for an amount of money. It has been
claimed that the basic skill in negotiation is not exchanging or compromising
between positions and issues, but reconciling underlying interests. 7"
In a simple "satisfaction" graph there may be a range where relative
levels of satisfaction between the parties may be reconciled, albeit for different
reasons. At this point, or in this range, both parties are satisfied to a greater or
lesser degree. This area is often called, in a simple two-party negotiation, the
bargaining range.80 Every negotiated settlement will not fall within the bar-
gaining range. The result of the bargaining is dependent on a number of other
factors such as risk aversion, negotiating skill and the parties' perception of
transaction costs. A settlement that falls within the bargaining range will be a
successful compromise and will represent for the parties the best that she or he
could do in the situation based on preferences, needs, expectation and assess-
ment of the other party. The bargaining range in negotiations between lawyers
for each party falls in many cases within the least favorable outcome she or he
would accept in lieu of going to trial and the least favorable outcome the oppo-
nent would accept in lieu of going to trial."1
Plaintiff who was injured in a minor automobile accident has sued for
78. C. KARRASS, supra note 8, at 144.
79. See R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 7, at 43.
80. G. BELLOW & B. MOULTEN, LAWYERING PRocEss 487 (1978).
81. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 660 n.63.
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$1,000. The defendant who feels that he was not at fault wants to pay nothing.
Plaintiff will accept $500 to avoid incurring the expense and inconvenience of
going to trial. Defendant can pay not more than $550 in settlement.8 2
Beyond Point X
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Beyond Point Y Can Pay No Wants to Pay $0
Will Go To Trial More Than $550 Defendant
Y
900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100
Defendant's Settlement Range
In this illustration the bargaining range is between $550 and $500 and
only a settlement within that range will satisfy the needs of both parties. In
some cases a major object of the negotiation is attempting to hypothecate the
bargaining range as a basic point of reference. The monetary bargaining range
and a dollar figure is only the overt representation of something either party
may desire. The real substance of the bargaining may, for the plaintiff, be
vindication or revenge; for the defendant, avoidance of further antagonism and
disruption where the prospect of litigation has a "nuisance value." The basic
object and the substance of the interaction between negotiators is an attempt
to satisfy the needs or interests that motivate every type of human behavior.8 8
The graph represents the simple fact of negotiation: Settlement requires satis-
fying both parties' needs and interests."
The lawyer uses his analytical skill to discover underlying needs and in-
terests from surface issues stated by the client and the other party.
82. These points, X and Y, are sometimes called resistance points or reservation
prices-the very minimum that plaintiff will accept; the maximum defendant will pay.
See H. RAIFFA, supra note 32, at 45-63 (probablistic analysis of this circumstance).
83. See A. MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY 107-22 (1954). Maslow
lists seven basic human needs as they effect behavior: physiological needs, safety and
security needs, love and belonging needs, esteem needs, needs for self-actualization,
needs to know and understand, and aethestic needs. Id. at 80-98.
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At a lawyer's operation level, we can see the interplay of skills in prepar-
ing for negotiation involving: (1) management of doctrinal and fact analysis;
(2) the manipulation of abstractions of language in the development of theory
of the case; (3) developing and elaborating the normative context of the nego-
tiation; and (4) discovering the real substance of the bargaining.
C. The Suitability of Negotiation As a Dispute Resolution Process.
Every case may not be appropriate for negotiation. The available choices
most often will be litigation or negotiation. Adversarial litigation or adjudica-
tion is the basic procedure in the United States and the American legal system
for the resolution of conflicts between people. This is the formal procedure
which calls for zealous representation of the warring parties by trained and
diligent lawyer-advocates whose fealty is owed to the clients solely. The work-
ings of that adversarial machine will mandate the emergence of the truth. Jus-
tice will flow to the parties and the greater social good will be done. The above
over-simplification captures the essence of the partisan advocate adversarial
model. Within that model, the American lawyer owes his and her unqualified
duty to the individual party or client and, at least by custom, owes a duty to
the mechanical system
A basic problem with the traditional partisan advocate role mechanism in
terms of its efficiency as a dispute resolution approach arises partially because
the professional relies on a reflexive response to how best to help a client re-
solve a difference with another. Law schools, whatever the merits regarding
reaching rigorous thought patterns, may be the spawning grounds for competi-
tiveness, aggressiveness, and selfishness. The entry into law school is itself
based on competitive academic and test-taking criteria. Academic success
there, which in turn opens the door to prestigious professional positions, is
extremely competitive, leading to a rank ordering of graduating students.
Most of the material for study are, or concern, judicial decisions, usually ap-
pellate opinions which are seen as contests between parties who are regarded,
often because of the result of the contest, as right or wrong, winners or losers.
Professional education seems to inculcate in students a competitive view of
themselves and explicitly teaches competitive partisan advocacy as an ultimate
process. "[L]aw schools train their students more for conflict than for the gen-
tler arts of reconciliation and accommodation. . . . [Their teaching] of the
capacity to think like a lawyer has . . . helped to produce a legal system that
is among the most expensive and least effective in the world."8
The danger for lawyers is that the mind set of partisan advocacy imputes
to clients a very limited set of objectives and a narrow scope of alternatives to
resolve those objectives, often pulling clients kicking and screaming into the
adversarial arena. Hostility presupposed, is created often where it might not
85. Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, Report to Harvard
Overseers for 1981-1982, reprinted in 33 J. LEGAL EDUc. 570, 582-83 (1983).
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have arisen. To the extent that partisan advocacy draws its beneficiaries into
the litigation process, it very often taxes them heavily in anxiety, time and
money. Institutionalized partisan advocacy tends to render difficult human
conflicts, such as divorces, more difficult to resolve, money claims, such as
those associated with personal injury cases, more socially costly, resulting in
the resolution machinery, the courts, becoming impossibly backlogged. The
antidote for lawyers is an analysis in every case of the propriety of various
approaches to dispute resolution for application in the specific dispute."
1. Nature of Outcomes; Availability of Affecting Factors
Because of the accommodative nature of negotiation, a wide range of
facts and norms can be taken into account in attempting to resolve the dispute.
The win or lose characteristic of adjudication limits the range of available
remedies and focuses on the most trustworthy and probable facts and the most
prominent and acceptable rules for decision."' Litigation as a choice is limiting
both in terms of a restricted outcome (win or lose) and the available justifica-
tions for a resolution. Negotiation is more likely to create a tailored solution to
a dispute and offer a full range of consideration of critical facts and normative
issues whether or not they would be acceptable in litigation.
2. Relationships
The adversarial nature and competitiveness of litigation exacerbates ex-
isting hostilities between parties in dispute and often creates bad feelings be-
tween lawyers representing the parties."
Where social relationships between the parties are a priority, they may
not wish to risk the relationship to the alienating characteristics of litigation.
Where relationships are significant and are important beyond the particular
dispute the accommodation ana reconciliation aspects of negotiation may sug-
gest that it will be the dispute resolution process of choice.89 Further, relation-
ships that are "multi-plex," that are continuing and involve many valued inter-
ests, may demand a compromise settlement which will allow the relations to
continue. Those disputes that arise out of a one issue relationship or "simplex
relationship" will often rely upon adjudication or arbitration, which leads to
win or lose decisions. In limited relationships clear winning may be more im-
portant than relational continuity.90
86. J. HARTJE & M. WILSON, LAWYERS' WORK 1-2 (1984).
87. See Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 654.
88. See Nilsson, A Litigation Settling Experiment, 65 A.B.A. J. 1818, 1820
(1979).
89. See, e.g., M. GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE BAROTSE OF
NORTHERN RHODESIA 18-23 (1955). The nature of the relationships in the Barotse
society studied by Gluckman set restraints on the settlement process.
90. Id.; see also Fuller, supra note 71, at 362-70; Fuller, Collective Bargaining
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In those disputes in which parties have a relationship and place a priority
on its continuance, the element of "reconciliation" will give the parties an in-
' centive to relax the stringency with which they might view the other party's
claimed facts or norms. This aspect of relationships in negotiation allows the
prediction that negotiation will show a high likelihood of success where parties
have some on-going relationship. 91 Stewart Macauley has documented the
avoidance of conflict created by the trappings of the law as a way of building
and keeping good business relationships; businessmen prefer not to use con-
tracts in their dealings with other businessmen so as not to create dispute."'
3. Issues in Dispute
The subject matter in dispute will often determine the choice between
negotiation and litigation. Those cases in which the conflict of interest is ex-
tremely high'" or parties are fighting over scarce resources' or resort to litiga-
tion may involve a norm or value that is not subject to compromise,' 5 will not
be negotiable.
4. Motives of the Parties
The choice of negotiation over litigation turns in many cases upon the
motivation of a party. Clients seeking new legal developments or desiring an
enunciation or clarification of the law, or even the secretly motivated client
often prefer that an issue be litigated rather than privately compromised. Liti-
gation is used as a skirmish or maneuver in economic or political warfare in
some cases. The motivation of the party is to expose the opponent to the incon-
venience, expense, disgrace or publicity of "involvement", with no concern
about the end result of the dispute." Litigation has begun to equalize power in
those situations in which a party with a secure and powerful position fails to
acknowledge legitimate grievances of a less powerful party.' A party may use
and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. REV. 3, 8-10 (both articles discuss the nature of
"polycentric" problems which because of the complexity and interdependence of facts
and relationships are unsuitable for adjudication).
91. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 649.
92. Macaulay, supra note 47, at 64-65; see also Nader & Todd, Introduction to
THE DISPUTING PRocEss--LAw IN TEN SOCIETIES 17-18 (L. Nader & H. Todd ed.
1978) (role of social relationships in the disputing process).
93. See Thibaut & Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 541,
551 & n.29 (1978); Walker & Thibaut, An Experimental Examination of Pretrial
Conference Techniques, 55 MINN. L. REV. 1113, 1116-21 (1971).
94. Nader & Todd, supra note 92, at 13.
95. See generally Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations of Adjudication,
6 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121, 128 (1982).
96. Felstiner, Influences of Social Organization on Dispute Processing, 9 LAw
& Soc'v REV. 63, 63 n.1 (1974).
97. See Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 672-75.
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the litigation process to fulfill a quest for power. 8 It has become increasingly
acceptable in our society to use litigation as a tool to insure fairness and to
advocate particular ideologies or notions of equality.
A disputing process or forum should be examined in order to understand
its likelihood for satisfying basic party needs through its process. Each party to
some degree or another needs substantive satisfaction: a result that is fair and
stable; a resolution of the issues and underlying interests of the party without
unnecessary cost or damage. Negotiation has a broader range of potential re-
sult that is likely to bring substantive satisfaction.
Concerns involving issues of procedural and psychological satisfaction
that must be analyzed in the selection of a dispute resolution process are more
ephemeral. Problems of ultimate party satisfaction are usually attended to in
attempting to prevent factors leading to dissatisfaction with the results of the
negotiation. These issues should be dealt with in preparation by choosing ap-
propriate resolution machinery. Assuring procedural satisfaction involves at-
tending to a party's feelings of involvement, equity or ownership in the disput-
ing process. Negotiation provides a high level of procedural satisfaction for the
parties. 9 This is generally analyzed as if parties negotiate without lawyers.
Negotiation can be a highly rewarding procedural experience for clients when
they are actively involved by their lawyers in the process. 00
Psychological satisfaction for disputing parties may be frustrated where
gut-level anger or hostility arising from the dispute has not been ventilated or
vindicated in the resolution process so that the party is emotionally satisfied.
In choosing a disputing process and planning an ultimate negotiation strategy,
each of these notions of satisfaction have to be weighed. Lawyers have to take
into account factors allowing for procedural fairness, regularity of procedure
and the involvement of parties in the due process of negotiation. To the extent
that it can be accomplished, clients who have been emotionally damaged or
insulted because of the conflict must be somehow vindicated in the process.' 11
5. Access to Disputing Procedure; Time-Delay Factors
Difficulty in access to a litigation forum and time-delay are obstacles to
the quick resolution of a dispute. Difficulties of access may involve problems in
pleading or issues that are not recognized by the court system and in some
98. Felstiner, supra note 96.
99. See Thibaut & Walker, supra note 93, at 549.
100. See D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 26, at 168-69. See generally Spiegel, Lawy-
ering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 123 U.
PA. L. REV. 41 (1979).
101. See W. LINCOLN & NATIONAL CENTER FOR COLLABORATIVE PLANNING IN
COMMUNITY SERVICES, INC., MATERIALS TO ACCOMPANY GENERIC COURSE IN NEGO-
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situations, jurisdictional or cost barriers. In many jurisdictions backlogs in the
courts create serious obstacles to the fast dispensation of results.10 ' Negotia-
tion has vast advantages over litigation in these two areas, assuming both par-
ties are motivated to bargain.
6. Costs
The transaction costs involved in litigation are factors that encourage ne-
gotiation and other non-adjudicative approaches to dispute resolution.'"3 For
many years, lawyers have "eye-balled a case" and given their clients general
estimates of cost factors that may be involved in litigation. The discussion
would center around the attorney's fees that would be charged in order to try
the case in court. For organizational or institutional parties many of the fac-
tors were completely in the hands of either corporate counsel or outside coun-
sel and the parties made little effort to place any checks on the expenses of
litigation. In many instances, litigation has transaction costs for parties that
require high prices to be paid in anxiety, lost opportunity costs, business good-
will and damage to relationships.'" Any serious analysis of cost must include
a lawyer prediction of the probabilities of: (1) exposure factors, the likelihood
of winning or losing on an issue of liability, the probable measure of damage
and a prediction of success or failure on counterclaims, cross-claims or other
responsive actions; (2) Direct and indirect financial costs must be accurately
estimated, including the attorney's fees of all lawyers legal assistants, interns
and investigators. Lost opportunity cost factors include payment to corporate
officers and employees who have to sit for depositions or trials and those in-
volved in investigation and travel to assist the lawyers and witnesses. Individ-
ual lost opportunity factors can be crucial. Lost wages for days spent in dis-
covery processes in trial can cause a financial drain that has a significant
impact on client choices; (3) Subjective factors have to be identified and quan-
tified on the basis of prior experience and probabilities. Some individual clients
pay incredibly high costs in their anxiety over litigation, costs often ignored by
their lawyers in evaluating transaction costs. The potential for negative public-
ity or the disruption of advantageous relationships may have a price tag that
needs to be factored into the case's total impact. A litigated case may have a
precedent value for future conduct that greatly exceeds the actual dollar value
of the case should the party win.
A careful exploration and understanding of the factors involved in "risk
aversion," the avoidance of "decision-regret" notions and a client's basic atti-
102. Friedman, Legal Rules and the Process of Social Change, 19 STAN. L.
REV. 786, 801-03 (1967).
103. See CORPORATE DISPUTE MANAGEMENT XV-XXi (E. Green ed. 1982) [here-
inafter cited as CDM].
104. See H. RAIFFA, supra note 32, at 73-77; CDM, supra note 103, at 306-308,
324-327; Friedman, supra note 102, at 801; Macaulay, supra note 47, at 63.
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tude toward the uncertainty of risk is extremely important. 105 Many client
choices are influenced by attitudes toward risk. Individuals who cherish cer-
tainty over risk are "risk-averse" while those who prefer to risk certain out-
comes are "risk-seeking or risk-preferring." Attitudes toward risk apparently
are influenced by the nature of the risk encountered. If one stands to benefit
there is a greater tendency to be "risk-averse;" to choose a sure thing over the
risk. For example, if given the choice of receiving $100 as a certainty or a 75%
chance of receiving $200 and a 25% chance of receiving nothing, generally one
will choose the $100 in the pocket over the risk of a greater gain. When facing
an out-of-pocket loss, one will choose the risk to avoid loss over the certainty
of loss. That is, one will gamble on the 25% of the odds that say no loss will be
sustained rather than to choose the smaller loss figure ($100) that is a
certainty.
The bald implication of preference findings is that certain plaintiffs will
be disposed to seek settlement and certain defendants will be disposed to resist
settlements in favor of litigation. Large institutional parties have a distinct
advantage in that they have a better "probabilistic" feel for the courtroom and
can unemotionally play the long-run averages in the face of time.106 This ob-
servation is confirmed by Galanter's findings comparing the likely success at
trial of small plaintiffs-individuals or small entities called "one-shotters"
against large companies and institutions--"repeat players."1 Large defen-
dants facing potential losses will tend to prefer the risk of litigation, while
small plaintiffs looking at anticipated gains will tend to be risk averse and
avoid litigation. The case for negotiation is often made by a careful analysis of
the real transaction costs involved in the litigation and the likely risk prefer-
ence of specific clients. 08
7. Uncertainty of Result
The uncertainty of result in court should foster a party's motivation to-
wards negotiation. Indeterminant results, either factual or because of an ambi-
guity over the proper rule to apply, are classic cases for a compromise (negoti-
ated) result. Litigation will give the risk-preferring party, even where he is
blameworthy, the opportunity to gamble to avoid responsibility. Negotiation
tempers the nihilism of result gambling, the uncertainty and unpredictability
of all-or-nothing outcomes. Further, trial outcomes often ignore the true re-
sponsibility between the litigating parties. It is a rare human encounter in
105. See generally Kahneman & Tversky, The Psychology of Preferences, Sci.
AM., Jan., 1982, at 160.
106. See H. RAIFFA, supra note 32, at 76-77.
107. Galanter, supra note 74, at 97-104. This probabilistic advantage could be
part of what Galanter calls a superior "capacity" for litigation. See also Eisenberg,
supra note 23, at 654 n.47 (effect of transactions costs on benefits secured by
adjudication).
108. See CPR, supra note 103, at 301-32.
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which one party is totally at fault and the other blameless. 0 ,
The more uncertain the trial results for both sides, the stronger and more
principled the case for proposing negotiation with its broader and more flexible
range of results and relative considerations."' 0
8. Accountability vs. Privacy
The importance of the public rendering of decisions by courts in litigation
cannot be overstated. The value of the enunciation of norms and the establish-
ment of precedent is a basic underpinning of our legal system. The negative
impact of negotiated private settlements on public issues where members of
the public are under-represented or unrepresented has yet to be fully
assessed."'
Every dispute must be examined carefully to ascertain the subjective im-
pact public accounting of the dispute would have on the dispute and on associ-
ated transaction costs."' Privacy and confidentiality in many cases will add to
the element of reconciliation that may be a powerful incentive in the negotia-
tion process." 8 Reconciliation may also be a significant factor in the psycho-
logical satisfaction that a disputant may derive from the negotiating process.
In the operational context of negotiation, there may be no more important
skill than the lawyer's ability to analyze and determine when litigation is ap-
propriate or when negotiation or some other dispute resolution procedure
should be used to most competently resolve a dispute.
109. See Thibaut & Walker, supra note 93, at 548. The authors maintain:
As applied to litigation, whether civil or criminal, distributive justice gen-
erally takes the form of evaluating the relative weight of each party's claims
for a favorable distribution of the outcomes and then rendering an allocative
decision that reflects these relative weights. These claims are primarily argu-
ments designed to maximize the party's perceived causal responsibility for, or
contribution to, "good consequences" (such as potential heir's claim of a
causal role in improving the value of property that is about to be divided) or
to minimize the party's attributed responsibility for a charge of "bad conse-
quences" (such as a claim of extenuating circumstances by a defendant
charged with homicide).
Id. at 548-49 (emphasis added). This aspect of the litigation system is clearly excep-
tional. Contra G. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 14; Coons, supra note 77, at 755-71
(Unlike the result of "distributive justice" discussed by Thibaut and Walker, most ad-
judicative results are win/lose.).
110. See Part I(C)(1) supra.
111. See Fiss, supra note 95, at 128. See generally Suskin, Environmental Medi-
ation and the Accountability Problem, 6 VT. L. REV. 1 (1981) (negotiated and medi-
ated disputes may create difficulties for interested parties and the public since the pri-
vate nature of the resolution often avoids public accountability).
112. See text accompanying notes 104-05 supra.
113. See Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 646.
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D. Lawyer-Client Decision Making: Collaboration and Counseling.
There is a direct relationship between client participation and direction of
the processes of litigation and negotiation and the client's subsequent view of
the justice rendered by the process.11" Everything that has gone before in un-
derstanding lawyer skills at the operating level, fact finding and management,
law finding and management, interpretation of the language and manipulation
of abstraction and communication skills, comes together in the context of law-
yer/client decision-making in negotiation.
Decision-making theory suggests that effective decision-making requires:
(1) gauging an existing situation in terms of what is known, (factual data,
doctrinal, normative and precedent information) and what is desired (client
goals); (2) generating alternatives to reach those goals; (3) projecting the
probability of the possible consequences of each outcome (prediction system);
(4) judging and choosing among the consequences of the alternatives (value
system criteria); (5) acting on the decisions that are made (implementation);
and (6) reevaluating each step in the process as new information is gained.11
1. Preparing for Decision Making
We have already explored one of the steps in the decision making process
by examining the potential choices of the litigation or negotiation alternatives
as a dispute resolution process. The assistance to the client in decisions regard-
ing negotiation goals requires as high a level of factual preparation as the
negotiation or litigation itself. The governing or arguable law should have been
carefully researched and absorbed. Statutory provisions, administrative regula-
tions and case law should be fully understood and copies of the appropriate
statutes or cases made for reference. An earnest attempt to assess or predict
the various needs, interests and motivations of the adverse party should have
been undertaken.
Lawyers often unnecessarily limit themselves in developing alternative so-
lutions to those based on obvious or traditional alternatives. Many flaws in the
traditional process of negotiation and contributory factors to stalemates are
the result of limited imagination--creative solutions or alternatives have not
been imagined; clients have not been exposed to creative proposals."' Lawyers
often trudge down the well-worn road that leads to only win/lose options,
stalemate, debilitating costs and often disaffecting results at trial. The lawyer
in the negotiation operation should constantly strive for creative alternate solu-
tions to the party's anticipated or discovered needs and interests that avoid the
114. See D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 26, at 168-69; Lehman, The Pursuit of a
Client's Interest, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1078, 1080-81 (1979); Spiegel, supra note 100, at
73-112; Thibaut & Walker, supra note 93, at 533.
115. See Gelatt, Decision-Making: A Conceptual Range of Reference for Coun-
seling, 9 J. CouNs. PSYCH. 240-245 (1962).
116. See generally R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 7, at 58-83.
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predictable straightjacketed options that mandate stalemates or keep clients in
the dark about proposals which may resolve the dispute.
2. Evaluating the Case
A central part of preparation for negotiation involves evaluation of the
case. 7 In order to properly evaluate a case for negotiation one must go back
to the basic question: Upon what conditions will the client either settle or go to
trial? Parties settle when it is more advantageous in their perception to take
what is offered than risk incurring increased costs in seeking to recover more
by litigation.
Properly evaluating a case, as any structured decision-making entails: (1)
determining the real risks involved in litigation, the likelihood of prevailing
and the probable result; (2) determining bargaining power and other control-
ling factors, including the litigation costs, indirect costs, and subjective factors;
and (3) comparing and exploring creative alternatives that may promote the
parties' needs and interests-resolutions that are not necessarily law or money
oriented. There are rules of thumb and probability formulas for ascertaining
the risk of a certain result of litigation. Often the risk and burden of predict-
ing an outcome is not fully shouldered by the lawyer. Judgments are made and
alternatives pursued without the necessary creative effort at careful decision-
making between lawyer and client.
3. The Likelihood of Prevailing
This area of lawyer forecasting is most difficult. It calls upon the negotia-
tor's courage and calm professionalism. But isn't it simple? Only apply the
facts to the law and see what occurs. What law the court may apply remains
obscure in some cases until jury instructions are given. What the real facts are
is often in great dispute and may never be subject to disclosure. "Real" facts
may only be disclosed in another version of reality: the jury verdict or judge's
order. It is the frightening uncertainty of this exploration of who will win that
is often the dominant factor creating bargained settlements.118 The uncer-
tainty of risk and results should stimulate settlements, providing an area of
risk reduction through bargaining. As the uncertainty of the result or the risk
of losing increases, settlement will appear more attractive, depending on a cli-
ent's risk preference characteristics. A negotiator's hard work is well spent in
an effort to predict for the client the outcome of litigation on the merits. The
client is owed one's skills as an objective judge rather than the zealous advo-
cate. Strengths and weaknesses of the legal and factual circumstances of the
117. Gerald Williams calls case evaluation the missing lawyer skill. G. WIL-
LIAMS, supra note 2, at 110 (quoting PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE: EVALUATION AND
SETTLEMENT OF PERSONAL INJURY CASES (N. Shane ed. 1976)) ("What needs to be
done is make an educated guess based largely on experience, if you have experience.").
118. See Part I(C)(7) supra.
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case must be coldly evaluated. The factual evidence and governing law should
be viewed as by an innocent with an open mind; the zealousness of the advo-
cate may have distorted the case, making it larger or stronger than it is.
Innumerable factors weigh on a result evaluation.1 1 A few that should be
considered are:
a. The Nature of One's Substantive Claim or Defense. Is it novel, a
fledgling theory, or the well-established product of defensible precedent or
statute?
b. The Law. Is there ambiguity in the cases or statutes supporting the
claims or defenses?
c. The Factual Proof. Can the case be proven? Does solid admissible
evidence support the theories, claims or defenses-those facts at the upper
rung of the proof priority ladder.'"
d. The Witnesses. Are the witnesses reliable and credible? If not, how
crucial are they and how much impact will they have on the proof? 1' 1
e. The Setting. What is the track record of juries or judges in the local-
ity on this kind of case?
The art of predicting is demanding but it is the core of a lawyer's skill in
decision making with the client.
4. The Probable Judgment
One needs to establish a settlement value of the case. Assuming victory
on the merits, one must attempt to evaluate the amount of damages that will
be awarded or the precise nature of requested equitable relief. There are a
number of rules of thumb or probability formulas for ascertaining a probable
settlement value in personal injury cases; there are few in a civil rights case.
Lawyers love formulas, one suspects because they give some comfort in the
uncharted seas of prediction.
The settlement value of the case in gross terms is the result of the per-
centage chance of prevailing on the merits times the probable dollar verdict or
judgment. The costs of litigation and the value of the award over time may
also be considerations in many cases. Formulas are there to be used in negotia-
tion. But the formula must have common currency. For example, the famous
formula, or rule or thumb, in personal injury actions, "three times specials,"' aa
119. "Lawyers can provide the basic information about each spouses' bargaining
endowment-the applicable legal norms and the probable outcome in court if the case
is litigated." Mnookin & Karnhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case
of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 985 (1979).
120. See Part I.(B)(2) supra.
121. See id.
122. The specials are liquidated damages-dollar amounts lost, e.g., because of
missed employment, medical bills, property damage and other items of "out of pocket"
damages. In some localities, the multiple is up to five or six.
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is so ubiquitous because it is well understood. It has been perpetuated by in-
surance company personnel and insurance defense attorneys and is a part of
the conventional wisdom of personal injury negotiation. The formula deals
naught with the etherals of personal injury lore: pain and suffering, loss of
earning potential and the like; 2 8 nor does it deal with costs of litigation, a key
factor in case evaluation.
Personal injury representation is a vital area of lawyers' work where an
example can serve as an illustration for case evaluation and preparation for
negotiation in other cases. Simmons, in Winning Before Trial,2 4 develops a
settlement formula for personal injury cases. FSV (fair settlement value)
equals PAV (probable average verdict) times PPV (percentage probability of a
plaintiff's verdict) minus UV (the uncollectable portion of the verdict) minus
PC (plaintiff's estimated cost in obtaining and collecting the verdict) plus DC
(defendant's estimated cost of defense), plus or minus intangibles.
FSV = (PAVxPPV)- UV- PC DC /- I.
The formula is useful because it gives insight in a shorthand way to important
factors involved in any negotiation where damages in dollars are the specie of
the negotiation. A formula assessment should emphasize what must be done in
negotiations: a careful weighing and analyzing of a case's strengths and weak-
nesses, an evaluation of risk, transaction costs and likely results. The goal is a
reasoned determination rather than an impulsive or rough rule-of-thumb as-
sessment. The fair settlement value figure can be used as a goal between attor-
ney and client, or the formula can be used to justify a reasonable offer or
demand for settlement.
Each case must be carefully dissected to establish its likely result and its
valuation. A feeling for the case or statutory law and the position of this case's
legal circumstance within the whole is necessary. The facts are crucial. Some
real evaluative effort is required in terms of monetary evaluation in those cases
where money is the relief requested. Cases in which novel results are de-
manded require novel methods of evaluation.
For predictions of jury verdicts in personal injury cases, one should have access to
services such as PERSONAL INJURY VALUATION HANDBOOK, published by Jury Verdict
Research, Inc., which publishes jury verdicts by geographic region for particular types
of injury, e.g., Concussion with Minor Injury-Tables of Verdict Expectancy, Specials,
probability range, average verdict and examples of recent awards. See generally H.
Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT 176-231 (1970).
123. Maybe this is as it should be. The specials are hard, cold, quantifiable,
no-nonsense items of damage that the jury will believe.
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5. Cost Savings
A key to the monetary cases is often the cost savings of settlement. 2
Real costs of litigation are a major factor in settlements and key elements in
any serious or sophisticated formula to arrive at the settlement worth of a
case. Such costs may be a significant part of the "risk" factor in the basic
cost-risk-advantage formula. In "monetary" cases one will want to evaluate
the probable outcome of litigation, the probable judgment, and hypothecate
the additional transaction costs litigation will impose on both parties. 2"
Assume that the parties have evaluated their cases and each anticipates
that a jury will award the plaintiff $20,000. If the case settles, without in-
creased expenditure of attorney time, plaintiff receives $20,000 and the defen-
dant pays $20,000. If the case is litigated, the jury will return the anticipated
$20,000. Each side will incur $5,000 in attorney fees and other expenses.
Plaintiff recovers $15,000 and defendant pays $25,000. This simple illustration
shows the profound impact on settlement value that attorney's fees alone gen-
erally make. Solid information or even educated guesses concerning an adver-
sary's costs of litigation can be crucial in arriving at a case's settlement value
as well as in the evaluation of the overall risk/advantage concept.
In many disputes even if the client "wins," she loses. The potential nasti-
ness and obnoxious side effects of a court imposed or jury determined litiga-
tion are serious issues that may affect a continuing relationship disastrously or
result in gross burdens in time and money even for the "winner." Frank dis-
cussion of these issues with the client may have a profound effect on the settle-
ment value of the case.
In preparing for decision-making with the client, the lawyer will "liqui-
date the past in order to shape the future" by fashioning a structured ap-
proach to govern the relationships and goals in a negotiation.12 7
6. Decision Organization
Decision-making in negotiation, by virtue of its complexity, the limita-
tions of the available information, and the problems with lawyer's ability to
articulate or conceptualize the crucial information is a difficult and uncertain
endeavor.1 28 Virtually all decision-making is probabilistic in some sense. 29 De-
cision-making as a common lawyer skill involved with rough probabilistic esti-
mates is envisioned even in the comments to the Code of Professional
125. See Part 1.(C)(5), (6) supra.
126. Id.
127. See Rutter, supra note 4, at 327.
128. See E. McGINNIES, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 410-21
(1976).
129. See generally J. VON NEUMANN & 0. MORGANSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES








In serving a client as adviser, a lawyer in appropriate circumstances should
give his professional opinion as to what the ultimate decisions of the courts
would likely be as to the applicable law.
The advocate may urge any permissible construction of the law favorable
to his client, without regard to his professional opinion as to the likelihood
that the construction will ultimately prevail.'30
Because of the difficulties of decision making, lawyers and clients may
tend to use a number of simplifying approaches called "heuristics" to reduce
the complexity of the information which must be integrated to yield a decision.
The lawyer should be aware that often such simplifying strategies can lead to
errors in judgment because of biases inherent in intuition and shortcuts or
simplifications in decision-making. 18' Decision aids should be developed to
compensate for the fact that in the lawyer-client decision process, the partici-
pants' cognitive capacities are not adequate for the complexity of the task.
Therefore, the lawyer should seek to engage in explicit calculations on
probabilities and incorporate careful decision analysis and discipline. 3 2
The lawyer's assistance to the client in the decision-making process is part
of a lawyer operation often described as counseling. It is a group of opera-
tional lawyer skills including decision-making skills, communication skills and
inter-personal counseling skills.'33
7. Counseling-Lawyer-Client Collaboration in Decision-Making.
The lawyer's responsibility in the decision-making process after the neces-
sary factual information is secured and goals are assessed is to present alterna-
tives to the client, predict the legal consequences of each alternative and to
involve the client in acting on the choice of decision.' 4 This process is ex-
tremely important in negotiation. Most often lawyers and clients are going to
be looking at the positive and negative consequences of the alternatives of trial
and settlement. Key factors in this assessment are the economic, social, psy-
chological and other consequences of either choice.1"5
130. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-3, 7-4 (1979).
131. Saks & Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial by
Heuristics, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 123, 126-45 (1981).
132. See generally H. RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS: INTRODUCTORY LECTURES
ON CHOICES UNDER UNCERTAINTY (1968); Tversky & Kahneman, Belief in the Law of
Small Numbers, 76 PsYc. BULL. 105 (1971). Howard Raiffa has made giant strides in
assisting with decision-making heuristics in THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION,
supra note 32. See id. app. A for two graphic decision making heuristics, one from
Howard Raiffa, the other from Professor Don Ellis.
133. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
134. See text accompanying note 114 supra.
135. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLI-
ENT-CENTERED APPROACH 158-72 (1977).
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In counseling clients lawyers cannot know their client's basic needs, as
that word is understood in our discussion of the satisfaction or need theory
since the client in many cases has not articulated properly or clearly his or her
needs or is simply only dimly aware of them. This is why lawyers cannot ap-
propriately make decisions on their own that will provide client satisfaction,
thus, the requirement for attorney-client collaboration in the counseling pro-
cess. An example might clarify the point:
Ms. C has brought an action against Right County for violation of her
civil rights during an illegal search of her house. The search occurred at the
behest of a bail bondsman assisted by three police officers who were in search
of her husband, an escaped burglar. The bail bondsman and the police officers
rudely and roughly went through her house searching drawers and dressers
and every item in sight. They entered the bedroom where her two children
were sleeping, disturbed them and caused them to react in a hysterical fash-
ion. As they left, one of the officers inexplicably struck Ms. C in the face with
his flashlight causing a severe contusion and requiring her to quickly jerk her
head backwards straining her neck. Ms. C's court costs and attorney's fees
are now respectively $500 and $2,000. Right County has offered $3,000 in
settlement of the dispute.
Ms. C's attorney has evaluated the case and states that there is a good
chance of obtaining a judgment for $5,000. He feels that liability clearly exists
here and the only issue is the amount of damages that will be awarded by the
trier of fact. The additional costs of litigation, mainly attorney's fees, are go-
ing to be $1,000. The attorney has stated that there is a small possibility that
the judgment could go as high as $7,000 or as low as $1,000.
In evaluating the case and making a decision, Ms. C and her lawyer have
established that there are a number of positive and negative consequences to
either alternative: settlement or litigation.
Economically positive: An economically positive consequence of accepting
the settlement offer would be $3,000 in hand, right away without any addi-
tional court costs or attorney's fees and no loss of income occasioned by time
taken at trial. The positive consequences of the litigation alternative would be
a very good chance of the recovery of $5,000 with some chance of recovering
$7,000.
Socially positive: Socially positive consequences of settlement may be the
elimination of publicity involving the case embarrassing to Ms. C. The per-
sonal and socially positive consequences of litigation could be the satisfaction
of Ms. C's present husband who wants to go forward with the suit and prove
that the county was in error as a matter of principle.
Psychologically positive: There are many psychologically positive conse-
quences of either alternative as well. Ms. C, if she settles for the amount the
county has proposed, avoids the anxiety and concern about the litigation which
is a constant problem to clients facing the possibility of trial. A positive psy-
chological consequence of litigation is that Ms. C has put the county to the
test and made her best effort to obtain reasonable compensation for the wrong
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the county did to her.
Economically negative: A negative economic consequence of settlement is
that Ms. C gives up an excellent chance at $5,000 for an additional investment
of $1,000.
Socially negative: A negative social consequence of the settlement alter-
native may be that Ms. C courts her present husband's disfavor by dropping
the suit. That is balanced against the positive result of eliminating any poten-
tial publicity.
Psychologically negative. A negative psychological consequence of settle-
ment is that Ms. C may feel that she is a coward if she avoids her day in court
as a result of choosing the settlement alternative. She feels the amount offered
is not enough to compensate her fully. Her ideas of fairness and justice have to
receive strong consideration. The negative personal or psychological conse-
quence of litigation is her basic anxiety about going to trial and the risk-
taking involved in giving up a sure thing,13 6 a sure amount of money balanced
against the investment of additional money with the possibility of ending up a
loser.
One can see that commonly in such a process, intangibles may outweigh
the tangible. There is no real way Ms. C's lawyer can determine which ephem-
eral alternative discussed can provide her with the greatest satisfaction. There
is no basis for evaluating what Ms. C's greatest satisfaction would be. The
lawyer in attempting to engage the collaborative process in order to arrive at a
set of goals, decisions or a negotiation strategy is using very imperfect tools.
One must attempt to obtain from Ms. C the general importance of each of the
consequences discussed and aid her in prioritizing these consequences so that a
negotiating goal is obtained. This task may involve invoking Ms. C's intuitive
weighing process or maximizing the lawyer's ability to articulate and forecast
the likelihood of each of the relevant consequences. The lawyer's job at this
point is to help the client develop and state a goal so that the negotiation can
go forward to attempt to achieve the goal.
The collaborative process goes forward successfully when each partici-
pant, lawyer and client, forecasts and decides priorities in his or her area of
competence. Ms. C, with counseling help from her lawyer in articulating re-
sults or probabilities can best decide the impact of the social, psychological
and economic consequences of the litigate-settle choice at this point in time.1 3 7
Her lawyer is in the position to forecast legal results based on factual circum-
stances. Her chances: A good chance (75% or .75) of $5,000 for an additional
investment of $1,000. A smaller chance at $7,000 (50% or .5) for the same
136. See text accompanying note 105 supra. Ms. C is likely to be risk averse at
least in comparison with the County. This should be taken into account in the decision
process.
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investment.""8
The narrative example illustrates two processes characteristic of counsel-
ing and negotiating phenomena: (1) the collaborative decision-making process
by which attorney and client work together to clarify goals, assess probabilities
and sometimes arrive at a course of action, and (2) the investment risk-cost
benefit phenomenon-what are the investment risks and costs of going forward
to litigation and the advantages to be gained by a trial vs. settlement. Are the
advantages to be gained worth the risks or costs to secure them?
E. Preparation for Negotiation.
1. Assessing the Conflict
A great deal of thinking and analysis has gone into developing conflict-
assessment devices in recent years particularly in the area of multi-party nego-
tiation. A conflict assessment device allows the lawyer to analyze various fac-
tors in the negotiation in order to obtain a clear understanding of the causes
and characteristics of the specific dispute.
The negotiator must identify all people and constituencies that have a
stake or an interest in the dispute and why they have an interest. The lawyer
should assess the values and interests that guide the actions of all parties. The
conflicting and common aspects of these matters should be assimilated.
Goals and the overt positions of each party should be identified and the
sources of information that the parties are relying upon for their overt posi-
tions should be understood. The sources of power for each party and their
attitudes toward one another and the negotiators' prospective attitudes are sig-
nificant. If appropriate, analysis of the prior relationship between the parties
should be carefully done to determine whether there are obstacles or patterns
of behavior that might affect the negotiation. Finally, a careful assessment of
the substance, as represented by the overt issues at stake, should be completed
including how these issues are represented by precedent, norm, principle,
power and the discovered facts."8
138. A decision matrix or decision tree setting out probabilities may be contrived
for each such analysis. See id. Howard Raiffa suggests that "human" value intangibles
can be manipulated and assigned numerical values using the "multiple, attributable
utility" theory. Address by Howard Raiffa, Section Program, Alternative Dispute Res-
olution, AALS Annual Meeting (Jan. 7, 1984).
139. See Lincoln, Colosi, McGlennon, Bingham, Moore, & Carpenter, Dispute
Assessment Tool, in W. LINCOLN, N. HUELSBERG & NATIONAL CENTER FOR COLLAB-
ORATIVE PLANNING AND COMMUNITY SERVICES, INC., MATERIALS TO ACCOMPANY GE-
NERIC COURSE IN NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION 68-79 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
W. LINCOLN] (description of useful assessment device).
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2. Identifying Causes of Resistance To Settlement
Lawyers tend to prepare their cases in the true adversarial mode, develop-
ing its strengths and focusing on the opponent's weaknesses. Insufficient spe-
cific attention is paid by the lawyer to the anticipated causes of resistance to
proposals to settle the dispute. When discussing developing a negotiation the-
ory of the case and fact management, the lawyer reasons from the general to
the specific in order to derive the unknown facts or rationales possessed by his
or her bargaining adversary. Similarly, the lawyer must try to -envision the
other side's reaction and resistance to specific proposals that are advanced. It
is always useful to examine a number of common potential areas of resistance
and conflict. A negotiator should anticipate resistance and be capable of per-
suading his opposite: (1) of the substance of the legal authority, norm, or prin-
ciple that legitimizes his proposal; (2) the ability of the negotiator to imple-
ment the proposal-to carry out and make good on the offer; (3) that the
proposal, if agreed to will be durable and feasible for its duration; that he or
she can demonstrate to his opposite ways in which the proposal can be posi-
tively presented to the constituents, clients, or others to whom he or she is
responsible; (5) of the feasibility and authenticity of information in the propo-
sal or data underlying the proposal or the technology that is its underpinning;
(6) that he or she can demonstrate how the proposed offer of settlement will
meet basic interests and substantively satisfy the overt issues in the dispute;
(7) how the proposal benefits the needs, interests, aspirations and goals of the
parties that underlie the issues in dispute; (8) that impass and the result of
impass (usually litigation) will create risk and generate costs in excess of those
that reasonably might be anticipated as a result of the proposal; (9) that the
proposal is consistent with his opposite's own ideas allowing him to "own" the
idea that is the root of the proposal.""
3. Breaking Down Issues in Dispute
In the preparation for negotiation, particularly in complex disputes, it is
helpful to organize the overt issues by breaking the dispute into distinct and
manageable parts in order to deal with the larger dispute more effectively.1 4 1
This simple organizational approach is called "problem fractionation." Most
lawyers in analyzing and organizing their negotiation regimen will come upon
this approach. This division allows a more manageable confrontation of a dif-
fuse conflict, but it may create a time-consuming and frustrating process in
negotiation. The more issues that proliferate for conflict and confrontation, the
more likely a negotiation may stalemate. The resolution of subissues may,
however, create a momentum of compromise and problem-solving that carries
140. See J. HARTJE, ALTERNATIVES IN DISPUTE SETTLEMENT FOR LAWYERS
360-61 (1984) (unpublished materials on file with the author).
141. See generally Fisher, supra note 15. See also W. LINCOLN, supra note 101,
at 121 (examples of problem fractionation in different contexts).
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through the entire range of the dispute.
4. Identifying "Agreements in Principle."
A conceptual converse of breaking down of issues into subissues is agree-
ment in principle. An agreement in principle is an attempt to create an atti-
tude of settlement toward the larger dispute or group of contentious issues
before attempting to assail each detailed subissue or interest buried in the dis-
pute. If carefully planned in advance, this approach can create a settlement
momentum that bypasses hot subissues. The agreement in principle operates
like a treaty that states "we are united in agreement on the larger issues, let
us not allow the details to stand in our way."1'42
5. Organizing Issue Development
Once the collaborative counseling process has been engaged and negotia-
tion decisions have been made, it is useful to develop a strategy of issue and
position development. This process involves an analysis of how to carefully and
systematically define and prepare the order in which issues or interests and
one's position on issues and interest unfolds during the negotiation. This can
be done in graphic form through an issue position development instrument. 8
This heuristic device allows a concrete representation of a client's inter-
ests and the interests of the opposite party and requires careful listing of the
factual issues that represent those interests for negotiation. It also aids in re-
quiring a priority ordering of the issues to be negotiated and the bargaining
development for each. The instrument uses a number of descriptive
terms-bottom line, fall back position, and initial position. A bottom line (re-
sistance point or reservation point) is the point at which the red light goes on
in negotiation. This is the line that the negotiator and client in preparation
have planned to be the perimeter beyond which the bargaining absolutely does
not travel.14 4 In the graphic tool, the bottom line is used as a "trip wire"115 or
guiding discipline allowing some margin in reserve-hence reservation point.
The instrument requires an order of completion which requires the attorney
and client to evaluate first underlying interests, then issues representing inter-
ests, the consequences of impass and then the respective positions that the
negotiator will take. The instrument requires scrutiny of priorities in a flow
that runs from minimum expectations to highest preference.' 4 6
142. See, e.g., W. LINCOLN, supra note 101, at 131.
143. See id. at 87-90.
144. R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 7, at 103. A bottom-line position may be
misleading and useless because negotiation is so much dependent on the communica-
tion and information from the other party which has the potential of changing the
minimal expectation of a negotiator, at any point in the bargaining. Id.
145. Id. at 106.
146. See id. app. A (Position Development Instrument).
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Such a heuristic cannot serve as a literal map for negotiation. It does not
deal with a major issue in negotiation: how to get from one issue or position to
another if you are engaged in positional bargaining. It does not deal with the
communication of offers or concessions, nor can it aid in linking issues or
packaging a particular solution. Some would criticize it because it encourages
positional bargaining rather than "problem solving." It does allow a visual
representation of serious matters in a negotiation and mandates a careful anal-
ysis of those matters in a prioritized fashion.
II. OPERATIONAL SKILLS IN NEGOTIATION
A. Communication Skills-Persuasion, Reasoned Argument.
Legal negotiation often involves the lawyers in "reasoned argument"" 7 in
which they present to one another competing analogies of case law and facts
and finally, if they settle, accommodating or ignoring the differences. This
"jury argument" form of negotiation is common. The real goal of the argu-
ment is to demonstrate how a jury or judge might react favorably.148 Each
lawyer negotiator will have a preferred result and settlement goal; each hopes
to move the other through reasoned and persuasive argument. 49 In many
ways, the appeal is analogous to the lawyer's approach in the courtroom with
the judge or the jury setting the standard for acceptability or rejection of the
various arguments. The negotiator/lawyer will marshall facts, norms, prece-
dent and power in order to engage in a persuasive discourse not unlike the
classical rhetorical exercises.' 50
Lawyer's who believe in the persuasive power of skillful argument should
examine the settings in which such arguments are used. In negotiation, the
context in which our skills are utilized should be as carefully examined as in
the traditional settings, with the negotiator as the audience. Each negotiator
(audience) represents unique bundles of predisposition and prejudices and will
respond to argument differently based on those individual social inclinations.
The facts presented and the law characterized are not some ultimate reality,
but are presented, conformed and colored to suit adversarial preferences. Yet
147. Fuller, supra note 71, at 366.
148. See, e.g., G. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 149; 152, 153-55, 158-60. On each
of those pages, one of the negotiating lawyers invokes the jury as the third-party audi-
ence, the critical mind to which their arguments will be directed.
149. See Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 667 n.87. Eisenberg cited an example of
the force of persuasion in negotiation. Bill Veeck, the baseball club owner in B. VEECK,
THE HUSTLER'S HANDBOOK (1965), in recognition of the persuasive power of Branch
Rickey, moved to limit that power by limiting the negotiation channel to a go between,
a bell boy. Id.
150. See J. HARTJE & M. WILSON, supra note 86, at 109-46; see, e.g., R.
STUCKEY, PRESENTATION ON NEGOTIATION TO THE 1982 AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF
LAw SCHOOL CLINICAL CONFERENCE (MARCH 1982).
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one's preferences are not the preferences of the negotiator/lawyer sitting on
the opposite side of the table. It is fair to assume that she is sitting there
waiting to refute whatever was said and to reduce it to shambles or demon-
strate it utter nonsense.161
The "jury argument" in negotiation is an admission by both negotiators
that they cannot persuade one another, but can only persuade through the
non-present, third-party jury which is the true judge of the argument. Even
while skillful lawyers admit the basic fallacy in attempting to persuade one
another, careful attention is made to the art of persuasion through the jury
argument artifice. If one were to analyze negotiation/persuasion, one would
likely find five important aspects of classical rhetoric: (1) Invention (determin-
ing what to say); (2) Arrangement (determining order of presentation); (3)
Style (determining the manner of presentation); (4) Memory and (5) Deliv-
ery 52 In persuasive efforts, lawyers consider whether or not to make emotional
appeals or appeal to the equities of emotion-those sustaining human princi-
ples that are beyond controversy. Appeals are made to reason, ethics 168 and
values represented by precedent and norms.
The argument may even be constructed in a formal ordered way. First,
one may argue the legal principle that the case represents from case law, stat-
ute or administrative regulation. The policy or the norm inherent in that legal
principle is stated and then compared to the factual situation of the case to
demonstrate, in the present circumstances that the facts fit within the princi-
ple or its spirit. Finally, it may be claimed that the result sought in terms of
negotiation goals will satisfy the inherent policy. All of this is with an eye to
the fictitious jury or judge.
A lawyer's skill can be effectively used in understanding the force of per-
suasive communication in the operation of negotiation: the elements of order
and emotional, ethical and logical appeals.
Yet, negotiation is about persuasion and learning. The arts of persuasion
are used in a coercive sense. The implicit threat is made that "if you do not
settle with me on the terms I suggest because I possess this information, prin-
ciple, power and equitable posture, the argument that I have just presented is
going to be accepted by a judge or jury to your detriment." It is the movement
that is occasioned by this coercion that may potentially result in settlement.
Much of what we know about skilled effectiveness in negotiation involves en-
hancing a learning process.'"
151. S. LANGER, PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW KEY ix (1971), cited in Condlin, supra
note 4, at 234 n.28 (description of the "debater's" mentality that privately judges com-
munication and then seeks to refute or discredit its force).
152. ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC 24 (W. Rys. Roberts trans. 1954).
153. An ethical appeal in the rhetorical sense referred to the speaker and how he
was perceived by the audience.
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B. Communication Skills - Language of Learning, Exchanging
Information, Concessions And Questioning in Negotiation.
1. Learning in Negotiation
Robert Condlin has identified certain approaches or responses to the am-
biguity of language and behavior. The two responses he identifies are the per-
suasion mode and a learning mode.155 He describes the persuasion mode as an
approach in which the person is involved in asserting or developing his inter-
pretation of an ambiguous communication. The learning mode is a response to
an ambiguous communication in which the person investigates and attempts to
understand and clarify the communication independently. 15 These constructs
are useful in envisioning and discussing communication in negotiation. In the
elaboration of reasoned and persuasive argument the negotiator appeals not to
his fellow negotiator in an effort to educate him but to coerce him with the
force of his argument to the imaginary jury or judge.
This persuasion is met by a listener attributing meaning to the ambiguous
part of the communication and thereby combining the speaker's content and
the listener's interpretation. The listener privately judges the communication
generally with a negative and predatory view. While the communication is
being detailed, the listener is already attempting to destroy or refute the con-
tent of the communication and may privately evaluate whether he agrees or
disagrees and why. The listener, then responds to the communication. This
process continues in a cyclical fashion. The persuasion mode is competitive
rather than additive, private rather than public, self-protective rather than
risk-taking, rational rather than emotional.15 7 The result of the persuasive
mode are quick, focused and simple explanations for complex phenomenon
rather than the generation and testing of more sophisticated hypotheses. "The
premium the mode places on taking and defending positions causes people to
concentrate on the quality of their own comments[,J often to the detriment of
hearing the valuable aspects of others' statements". 15 8
The learning mode involves inquiry, the process of obtaining information
about another's communications; "owning up," the process of sharing with an-
other the intellectual and emotional reactions to their statements; and testing,
the process of eliciting and assessing reaction to one's own views in order to
decide whether to agree or disagree.1 59 Inquiry might involve the discovery and
fleshing out of the basis of other person's communication including the infor-
mation or experience upon which it is based and the inferences or interpreta-
tions from that information. Inquiry may involve suspending judgment and
155.' Condlin, supra note 4, at 231.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 238.
158. Id. at 245.
159. Id. at 246.
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questioning rather than agreeing, disagreeing, or rebutting the communication,
or it might encourage the other to continue to elaborate rather than appearing
to reject or to "jump into the exchange."'160 Owning up involves sharing ideas
and feelings in order to express the complexities of emotion and thought and
reactions based on statements of direct "data."'' Testing, the third aspect of
the learning mode, is the comparison of one's beliefs and information with the
other person and its measurement against some criteria of validity."62
The Condlin typology may be useful in its insightful analysis and seeming
description of the skilled interpersonal communication involved in problem
solving (learning mode) versus positional (persuasive mode) bargaining and
helping enhanced understanding of cooperative vs. competitive psychological
approaches in negotiation.163 Both behaviors are necessary for the explication
of ambiguous communications. This identification of complimentary modes of
dealing with ambiguous communications can be a useful construct in under-
standing communication in negotiation. Much of what is described as persua-
sion we have examined.'" Much of what is seen as the learning mode is found
in approaches to negotiation which are called "problem solving," "collabora-
tive" or "cooperative."'"' A dynamic is presented of openness, inquiry and
questioning. The learning mode suggests fairness in its approach by explicitly
stating the data from which one proceeds to make conclusions, allowing room
for supplementation, and encouraging the other to express contrary informa-
tion or material for mutual evaluation.
Implicit in these descriptions of negotiating behavior is the use of inquiry
and questioning approaches. "Learning" questioning can help achieve a num-
ber of goals that permeate the remaining discussion of exchanging informa-
tion, concessions, confirming approaches and using hypotheses to lay out op-
tional settlement alternatives. The openness, encouragement and flexibility
described in the learning mode can be accomplished by a lawyer's interper-
sonal counseling and questioning skills. These are skills employed throughout
the lawyer's repetoire of operations. "Active listening"' 166 or "role reversal" is
an approach that replicates the learning behavior described above. A negotia-
tor encourages his opposite to continuing talking by appropriate responses. He
then accurately and completely paraphrases the other's position, arguments,
concerns and feelings in a way that indicates comprehension of those matters,
before requesting supplementation, testing and expressing conflicting matters.
160. Id. at 236.
161. Id. at 237.
162. Id. at 237-38.
163. R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 7, at 22-40, 51-57, 70-83; J. RUBIN & B.
BROWN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATION 182-95, 200-06
(1975); G. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 20-40, 42-54.
164. See Part II(a) supra.
165. See supra note 163; see also C. KARRASS, supra note 8, at 124; G. NIEREN-
BERG, supra note 84, at 184-95.
166. See D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 135, at 25-37.
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Active listening expresses a sincere interest in understanding the other person's
position, feelings and perspective. The use of role reversal in questioning and
active listening can be helpful in changing a win-lose oriented negotiator into a
problem-solving oriented negotiator. It may assist two problem-solving ori-
ented negotiators to understand each other and help to find creative integra-
tions of their client's interests. Lawyer skills in questioning using active listen-
ing techniques can clarify misunderstandings of the other's positions, assist in
increased understanding of the other's position, and aid in one's ability to per-
ceive the issue from the other's perspective.167 The skillful use of role reversal
and active listening can result not only in a reevaluation of the issue on the
table, but a change in attitude toward it.'" The negotiator who uses the learn-
ing mode will be perceived as a trustworthy negotiating partner."6 , Active lis-
tening facilitates constructive management of conflicts and can significantly
aid in the settlement of negotiations.1 7 0 Brief guidelines for such an approach
suggest that the person using the approach: (1) restate the other person's ex-
pressed ideas and feelings in one's own words rather than parodying the words
of the other person; (2) begin the reflected remarks with "you think" "your
position is. . ..., ..you feel. . ." "it seems to you. . .", or "I understand you to
feel. . .". This emphasis focuses on the other person and clarifies whoseposi-
tion is being expressed and comprehended; (3) avoid any indication of judg-
ment or disbelief in paraphrasing the other person's statement. It is important
to refrain from interpreting, blaming, persuading, or advising; (4) make the
non-verbal messages congruent with the verbal paraphrase; (5) be interested in
and open to the other person's ideas and feelings and concentrate on what the
other person is trying to communicate. 71 This approach allows sincere at-
tempts to enhance communication and listening through understanding as well
as questioning. It allows for an equity in presentation of points of view and
information and allows for subsequent inquiry, fair response and testing of
that information in the same above-board, non-manipulative way.
Active listening or role reversal approaches using questioning in which the
listener reflects, clarifies or reacts to communications of another person are
techniques used by skilled lawyers in counseling, interviewing, fact gathering,
depositions, discovery, jury voir dire and virtually throughout the lawyer ver-
bal skills repetoire.
Testing approaches in negotiation involve questioning as well. Testing
questions seek to evaluate the feasibility of proposals, the seriousness with
which proposals are presented, hypothecate alternative scenarios in which a
negotiating proposal might be implemented, and seek or request objective
standards to be used to measure specific proposals. Some examples of testing
167. D. JOHNSON & F. JOHNSON, supra note 28, at 292.
168. Id.
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questioning are: (testing feasibility) "How would the parties specifically imple-
ment that proposal and how much would it cost to do that?" "Why do you
think my client can afford to pay that much?" (testing seriousness) "How
would that proposal work in detail on a practical level?" "How do you see
your proposal operating five years down the road when the party's situations
have changed?" (testing alternatives) "How would that proposal work in de-
tail on a practical level?" "If you were serious about that proposal would you
be willing to let the measuring device be the Consumer Price Index for the last
year?" (testing for availability of objective standards) "Can we use sales of
similar buildings in the area over the last six months to establish a sales
price?"
The irony of most negotiation is that two things are being bargained for:
specific demands which are on the table and made openly and the real needs
of the parties, which are often covert. Adversarial mistrust often creates or
exacerbates the deceptive characteristics of some bargaining. An important
part of any negotiation strategy involves the accumulation of necessary infor-
mation to assess a client's needs and evaluate his case. A second important
part is assessing the other parties' unstated needs, interests, resistance or res-
ervation points, which are often ill-expressed by a bargaining "position."
Hard work, through fact finding and management, discovery, investiga-
tion, research and analysis provides some of the necessary information. The
bargaining process itself can provide a substantial part of the remainder.'
2. Information Exchanges
Information gathering is always easier preceding an informal bargaining
confrontation. Once the formal discussions begin, the participants often be-
come defensive: they put on their "game faces." Information about the other
sides real needs may be scarce, so one should start early. Each contact, meet-
ing or telephone call should be used to elicit information that may prove use-
ful. Clues will be given concerning the level of preparation for the case and
knowledge of the law and the facts. Casual inquiries will often yield informa-
tion on the type of business done by opposing counsel, the type of organization
or persons represented that may aid the negotiation.
Other clients, judges, secretaries, clerks, or attorneys who have negotiated
with the adverse party may willingly respond with information about the other
side and its attorney if a nonthreatening approach is used.
Everyone has a track record and one can learn from other's experience.
All of this casual information plugs into vital factors in the negotiation: What
is the opponents's resistance point, time pressure, costs of litigation or assess-
ment of the value of the case? This information will also be the beginning
point in the negotiator's attempt to change the other side's perception of those
costs and risks. By the time one enters a formal negotiation, which may be in
172. See P. GULLIVER, supra note 33, at 83-85.
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a single conference or a series of informal contacts or telephone calls, one
should have a substantial amount of information with which to negotiate
effectively.
3. Initial Probing" 8
Prior to the beginning of serious bargaining, attempts should be made in
an informal context to sound out the other side's reactions to various proposals
so that one can attempt to measure their resistance points, level of prepara-
tion, bargaining style and motivating interests. Generally because of adver-
sarial mistrust, many lawyers will not communicate beyond small-talk or pos-
turing until a perceived reciprocal risk takes place. The shared risk in
negotiation is the disclosure of information to receive information in return .
4. Listening for Information In A Negotiation Setting
In competitive settings negotiating parties rarely give the other side any
hard or useful information about real interests because of adversarial mistrust.
Information is often communicated only for strategic purposes. '  A negotiator
must be disciplined and use effective listening. Careful concentration on what
is going on can result in significant information about the other side's feelings
about issues, motivations and real needs. Attentive listening means not only
hearing and observing what is said, but also understanding what is omitted
and why. For example, when one hears generalities, fudging, evasion, circum-
vention, it most likely means polite lying is going on. This should be a clue
leading to important information that may be secured by specific questioning
in order to clarify what is actually being said.
5. Cues - Intentional and Unintentional
A question does not even have to be answered to supply useful informa-
tion. Often messages or cues are sent whose meaning may be ambiguous and
require interpretation.176 We are all familiar with the nervous laugh, the star-
tled expression, the quick comeback, the unnaturally long pause, all of which
may indicate that a question exposed a sensitive or important issue. The re-
sponse may prove a clue to what the answer could have been. The information
that can be gleaned from unintentional clues may be extremely helpful if used
by the aware negotiator to confirm or change his tenative appraisal on a num-
ber of core issues.
173. See G. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 72-73. Williams describes this as orien-
tation and positioning.
174. See P. GULLIVER, supra note 33.
175. Mnookin & Karnhauser, supra note 119, at 972-73.
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These cues may be the (1) unintentional verbal cue, the word used con-
veys an inadvertent message, as in a Freudian slip; (2) the inapposite verbal
cue, in which the voice inflection or emphasis states something other than the
words being spoken; (3) conduct cues, body language expressed in posture; eye
deflection or contact, facial expressions, hand and leg movement where one
sits, who talks first and so on. 177
The study and meaning of these cues has become very popular in recent
years. The field has been named proxemics--examining people's movements in
close space. Reading cues is only a function of the listening and observation
sensitivity that should be possessed by the skilled negotiator. Cues should be
used to reflect upon prior careful assessments rather than to attribute universal
meanings to isolated gestures or reactions. The deflected eye when delivering a
first offer confirms the obvious.
6. Calculated Listening
People like to fill silence with talk, even negotiators and especially law-
yers. An information approach which involves silence is calculated listening.
Much like active listening and role reversal 78 this behavior involves demon-
stration of a willingness to listen to the other side in an understanding way,
and to reinforce the other side's talking by expressing sympathy and under-
standing. In addition to the "learning" benefits described earlier, often the
other party will fill the air and the silence with useful information.
7. Confirming Approaches
In most negotiations, it is reasonable to request that each of the adversa-
ries' factual assertions or definitions of the legal issues be confirmed by hard
evidence-inspection of the underlying documents or the file, or a reading of
the cases in question. An acceptance by the opposing party of the attempt to
obtain confirmation is likely to lead to more information and give a clue as to
the strength of the case and the interests of the other party. A rejection of
objective requests to confirm factual assertions or legal conclusions also pro-
vides information about the accuracy of the information and the good faith of
the negotiator. Confirming information is similar to, but should not be con-
fused with, a negotiator's attempts to request outside "objective standards" as
a means of breaking through positional posturing.1 79 The former may control a
blow-hard bargainer and require hard data, the latter often provides a neutral
language for a solution to the parties' needs and reinforces concessions.
177. See, e.g., Suggs & Sales, Using Communication Cues to Evaluate Prospec-
tive Jurors During the Voir Dire, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 629, 634-37 (1978).
178. See text accompanying notes 166-71 supra.
179. See text accompanying notes 171-72 supra; see also R. FISHER & W. URY,
supra note 7, at 91-96 (The use of objective standards takes an issue in bargaining
outside of the will and informational base of the negotiator).
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8. Offers and Demands
In negotiation the offer or demand often functions much as an overture in
a musical play. It sets the tone, it conveys information about what is to come,
but only in a vague and general way. Many offers or demands may initially
conceal real agendas and needs. They obviously function as information de-
vices as well. An offer or demand may convey in a credible statement the
minimum the party can give or accept. It must be credible in order to spur a
response that may provide some clue to an opponent's interests or settlement
preferences. Offers and demands also represent positions that may inhibit
problem-solving by ignoring, in many cases, the real desires and concerns of
the parties.
(a) The First Position
It is generally the case that most negotiators believe the initial position of
their adversary to be negotiable. 8 ' Aggressive negotiators often make a large
initial demand or a low offer to allow for errors in both one's evaluation of the
case and the other side's assessment of the position, which may be even more
favorable.1 81 It appears that negotiators that are not sure of their evaluation of
the case tend to use the opening position to set their own goals. 182
Because of the difficulties involved and the belief that taking the first po-
sition by offer or demand puts one on the defensive and shows an eagerness to
settle, many lawyers wait for the other side to first take a position. This con-
ventional wisdom has led to compulsory settlement conferences and much
"courthouse step" negotiation. 8'
(b) Reducing Offers - Increasing Demands
An attempt to retreat from the negotiation trend by increasing a demand
or withdrawing or reducing an offer during the give and take, is in most cases
deadly to the bargaining. One who engages in such conduct cannot be seri-
ously regarded by an adversary in most cases and will be accused of violating
an established norm in negotiation: "bargaining in good faith."
There are situations where the value of the case increases over time, or
180. The glaring exception to this observation is the technique called "Boulware-
ism," which entails stating initially one's postion by offer or demand and not moving.
This was a technique employed by Lemuel R. Boulware, a former officer and negotia-
tor for General Electric.
181. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 73.
182. See G. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 7 (recent study of Des Moines negotia-
tions in which the high opening bid seemed to affect the amount of the settlement).
183. Courthouse step negotiation is the familiar practice of discussing settlement
for the first time virtually on the courthouse steps the morning of the trial. See gener-
ally J. HARTJE & M. WIlSON, supra note 86, at Ch. 7.
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conditions which prompted an offer have changed. These changes in position
are justified and can be explained. Only rarely will such a retreat be ethically
or practically justified at the bargaining table. When the other side will not
bargain at all, uses tactics contrary to compromise, or engages in bad faith
conduct, the withdrawal of an offer or increase in a demand may be justified.
Stalemate should not be feared if one's opponent will not respect established
bargaining norms and the basic goals of negotiation.
9. Concessions, Communications and Commitments
Two negotiators have been talking for some time. No problem-solving ap-
proaches emerge to unravel this share bargaining setting. Negotiator A has a
flat injunction from her client that she must settle this minor contract dispute
for no more than $1,500. Negotiator B has been instructed to obtain as much
as possible for her client, but to settle the case. After much skirmishing, Nego-
tiator A seriously makes her first offer of $1,000. Negotiator B states that the
offer is wholly inadequate but makes no counter demand. More skirmishing.
Time passes. The negotiation is dead still. A and B are each thinking that she
must make an additional concession. Each argues to herself the advantages of
a concession at this time; to avoid stalemate and antagonize the client: to be
"reasonable" and be "negotiating in good faith,"-normative appeals that can
be employed to move the negotiation. Negotiator A offers $1,400 without ex-
planation. What will Negotiator B assume about A's budget and resistance
point? (The maximum dollar point beyond which A will go to trial?) B will
assume that A has $1,600, $1,800, $2,000 or more to spend; A will not really
resist or stalemate if pressed to $1,600 or above.
Why? Two reasons: (1) the increments between $1,000 and $1,400 are so
great that the logical expectation of a resistance point has to be more than
$1,500, and (2) the second offer becomes an extremely damaging concession
because it is irrational.'"
A is on a concession escalator. She has offered two concessions without
requiring any exchange or counter concession. She has failed to support or
justify either concession by showing it has a rational basis or that she now is at
a firm figure. B will never believe that A has only $1,500 to spend. B will
accept only amounts above $1,500 or stalemate and go to trial.
Even recent law graduates who admit ignorance of negotiation are able to
generally describe the process as a series of offers and counter offers. The ex-
ample above illustrates aspects of most bargaining between inexperienced or
untrained participants. The de facto capitulation is a result of viewing negotia-
tion primarily as a positional numbers game and ignoring the dynamics of
language, persuasion and reasoning. Concessions, offers or demands that are
184. See T. SCHELLING, supra note 39, at 34; C. STEVENS, STRATEGY AND COL-
LECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATION 77-96 (1963); W. ZARTMAN, THE NEGOTIATION
PROCESS: THEORIES AND APPLICATIONS 81 (1978).
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not carefully explained or justified with specificity and persuasiveness, will not
be perceived as credible. Further, the magnitude or frequency of concessions
often communicates an unmistakable message about an opponent's resistance
point.' 85
In the hypothetical above, the second concession came as a result of the
excruciating choice between weakening one's bargaining position by concession
or risking stalemate. Often in the successful negotiation, reciprocal concessions
are the language of bargaining. Concessions and conciliatory behavior some-
times encourage the opponent's expectations and intransigence lowers expecta-
tions.166 One has Hobson's choice. Concessions are damaging to one's bargain-
ing status (real and as perceived by the other side), yet compromise is most
often impossible without them.
The interest satisfaction and problem-solving aspects of compromise in
most bargaining ultimately dominate the concern over temporary loss of posi-
tion represented by a concession. Negotiators must trust to a certain extent
that compromise concerns will prevail and that mutual concessions will ulti-
mately result in a beneficial settlement. Together with this trust must exist
skilled understanding of concession behavior.
Each concession must be carefully thought out in advance and a fallback
position on an issue understood.187 In order to avoid the expected psychological
result of a concession, one must make sure that the new point where the bar-
gaining rests is a firm stopping point: a commitment point beyond which one
cannot go, at least on the basis of any concessions or arguments advanced so
far in the bargaining.
Thus, a concession should emerge in four parts:
1. A well reasoned, carefully justified relinquishment of a previous
position.
2. The arrival at a new bargaining point to which the negotiator is com-
mitted for reasons of principle, fairness, cost, precedent, logic, client direction,
lack of authority, and so forth.
3. An extraction, on the basis of the spirit of compromise and good faith
bargaining, of a counter concession with a willingness to entertain further
discussion.
4. Any concession and a new commitment point should be articulated in
the language of the parties' needs or interests rather than some mechanical
position or posture.
Example: (Plaintiff's attorney Jones in a false arrest and false imprison-
ment civil rights case:)
(1) I have reconsidered our discussion of our request for $10,000 in
185. See C. STEVENS, supra note 184, at 77-96.
186. See Chertkoff & Conley, Opening Offer and Frequency of Concession as
Bargaining Strategies, 7 J. PERs. & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 181, 184-86 (1967).
187. See Part I(E)(5) supra.
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punitive damages. For the sake of argument, I will agree that Morgan v.
Smith could be read to support your contention that punitive damages might
not be available in a case of this type even though the trend in the cases is
clearly in our favor. Look at Gitsdorf v. Watson. Because of the uncertainty
in the courts on this issue, I might be willing to recommend to my client a
reduction of the amount to $8,500 and discuss it under our general damages
claim. I realize your client's aversion to the label "punitive." Although my
client would like to deter this type of conduct in the future, I might be able to
convince her that it does not matter what label we place on any particular
type of damage.
(2) The $8,500 figure represents a fair approximation of jury awards in
this area for general damages in wrongful detentions of this duration, at least
in my last review of jury verdicts. I am certain I cannot sell her on any lesser
figure regardless of what we call it. She feels already as if we are letting your
client off the hook in terms of publicity and accountability by talking
settlement.
(3) If you will reconsider a written public apology by your people to be
published in the paper, this might satisfy her on that point. She feels that
people think she is some kind of criminal simply because she was arrested and
detained.
(4) If we can agree on the amount and this general approach, I think we
can draft the language of the letter to absolve her of the "criminal" implica-
tions and talk in terms of perhaps honest mistake as far as your client is
concerned.
The example roughly illustrates the four part concession development; but
it shows also other attributes of effective concession communications.
10. Inventing Alternatives
One of the core issues in the concession dilemma between A and B was
the real or perceived position loss or weakness involved in making a concession,
even a carefully reasoned and justified concession. In the example, Jones is
offering an invented or hypothetical scenario that communicates a readiness to
concede if her opposite concedes.1"8 The conditional concession represents a
movement toward accommodation with a minimal risk of position loss. The
client must ratify the concession after Smith (defendant's attorney) signals
that he is willing to compromise as well, perhaps with a modified version of the
invented scenario. Further, Jones valued the concession so that it can be trans-
lated into the language of a lawsuit negotiation. Because of the invented and
qualified scenario, Jones will be able to explore Smith's perception of the re-
spective interests or needs of the parties. Jones is taking a conditional conces-
sion risk in an environment of protection in exchange for the potential rewards
of reshaping the bargaining: from positional (share bargaining) to interest
188. R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 7, at 59-83 (the process of generating a
variety of possibilities before deciding avoids many of the problems inherent in "posi-
tional" bargaining-the sequential taking and giving up of positions).
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(problem-solving) bargaining; from posturing deadlock to mutual concessions.
Smith's total rejection of the need-accommodation signal may represent a
violation of the established norms in bargaining: a refusal to negotiate or indif-
ference to the needs of his client. Such offenses to the conventional norms
could ultimately strengthen the hand of Jones.
Should Smith not engage in the collaborative endeavor with Jones, Jones
still has the tools for the hard bargainer's game. The invented possible solu-
tions can be honorably withdrawn in face of Smith's "intransigence and fail-
ure to bargain in good faith."
Much of what we have discussed in surveying the nature and dynamics of
the bargaining process has involved creating logical approaches and problem-
solving designed to improve the bargaining environment. Much of what goes
on in negotiation does not appeal to logic or reason to make things happen.
Solving problems skillfully and honorably for one's client depends on the abil-
ity to recognize aspects of a psychological process in which logic and appeals
to reason play only a small part.
C. Managing the Psychology of Negotiation.
1. Dealing With Anger
Participants often approach a bargaining setting with a calculated atti-
tude toward the process and particularly toward the other side. Sometimes an
emotional attitude is parlayed into a technique designed to exact concessions
or lower an adversaries' bargaining expectations. Displays of anger or personal
hostility toward one's opponent are often seen in bargaining. Anger may accu-
rately communicate the seriousness of a position when displayed in response to
the rejection of an offer, or it may be feigned in order to manipulate. Anger
may intimidate: it may cause an opposing negotiator to question his bargain-
ing position. The use of anger or personal animus in a negotiation is more
likely to harden a position, provoke an angry response and transform an adver-
sary into a visceral opponent--one who not only disagrees with your view but
who despises you as a human being.
Often in bitter disputes the negotiation event may be the first opportunity
for the adversaries or their lawyers to really square off. The likelihood of emo-
tional fireworks is high. Anger or another powerful emotional response is un-
derstandable and is going to affect the bargaining. If possible, emotions should
be talked about, acknowledged by the parties and dealt with as any other fact
involved in the bargaining. If the background of the dispute is exceptionally
hostile, ground rules prohibiting a rehashing of the angry past may help defuse
a volatile bargaining session.
It may be best to respond to anger, real or feigned, by listening without
reacting or interruption, until the speaker has completed his attack, acknowl-
edge his anger and move to any substance contained in the outburst if possible.
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Thus: "I can understand that my client's conduct makes you angry-his con-
duct appears irrational but this is what he is concerned about. . . (substance)
. . . his conduct is just his way of trying to deal, perhaps ineffectively, with
that issue." This focus, whether the anger is real or feigned, comes back to the
merits without ignoring potentially pent up emotions, allows the speaker a re-
lease if the anger is real, and permits him to "talk tough" without affecting
the issues of substance.
Finally, in most disputes the parties and their lawyers may be better psy-
chologically prepared to shed blood than work towards compromise. An angry,
fearful, hostile response creates an environment in which cooperation or mean-
ingful bargaining becomes extinct because the obstacles to agreement are
compounded by palpable "personal" factors.
2. Aggression As An Obstacle
Hard bargainers are aggressive. Aggressive negotiators "win." These
statements are representative of the conventional wisdom in negotiation. Ag-
gressiveness as an approach is seen in the negotiator that attacks: he attacks
his adversarys' case law, grasp of the facts, argument and ultimately his pro-
posals for settlement. He may do this as an approach or maneuver or because
of an aggressive personality. Conventional wisdom and some studies seem to
support the notion that the aggressive hard bargainer normally "prevails" in
bargaining. Without a thorough study of the context of the bargaining, such
generalizations are misleading. Moreover, recent empirical data seems, in a
general way, to contradict conventional wisdom.189
Aggressiveness cannot be an effective approach, in that it may stimulate a
retrenchment of positions or foster defensiveness. Those who are naturally co-
operative, problem-solving or conciliatory, should be cautious about adopting
an aggressive mein as a negotiating attitude.
3. Competitive/Hard Bargaining-Winning or Losing
At the close of every major labor negotiation or the completion of a nego-
tiated international agreement, the media analysis of the event invariably pro-
nounces a winner or a loser. The media's "post game" dissection of the 1982
NFL players' strike pronounced the owners as victors, the players as losers,
based on prenegotiation positions taken in statements to the media, even
though any careful look would show that the interests of both sides had been
substantially served by the agreed compromise. The winner/loser phenomenon
institutionalized by our culture and its adjudicative process finds its expression
in approaches to negotiation.
The hard, competitive bargainer takes the share bargain or zero sum
game approach with every negotiation. The competitive bargainer is concerned
189. See G. WILLIAMS, supra note 2.
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with winning against a perceived adversary. In addition to possessing a very
competitive attitude, this bargainer employs a posturing approach which is
designed to lower the opponent's expectations. Generally hard competitive bar-
gainers take extreme initial positions1' and attempt to express their commit-
ment to their position by emotional approaches including anger, personal hos-
tility and aggressive behavior. Hard bargainers attempt to avoid making any
concessions and are unlikely to reciprocate when one concedes them some-
thing. When a concession is made, it is minor and often just before stalemate.
A hard bargainer will claim (often) that he has no authority to settle or even
make concessions or that he really wants to go to trial. Any attempt to settle is
simply a courtesy to the opponent, not really an earnest desire to reach
agreement.
Hard competitive bargainers operate in a world of mistrust. The commu-
nication that is used is most often designed to deceive or intimidate. Informa-
tion that is received directly from the other side is disregarded. When competi-
tive bargainers get together, the result is that:
It [the competitive process in bargaining] stimulates the view that the solu-
tion of the conflict can only be of the type that is imposed by one side on the
other by superior force, deception, or cleverness-an outlook which is consis-
tent with the definition of the conflict as competitive or win-lose in nature. It
leads to a suspicious, hostile attitude which increases the sensitivity to differ-
ences and threats while minimizing the awareness of similarities. . . Since
neither side is likely to grant moral superiority to the other, the conflict is
likely to escalate as one side or the other engages in behavior that is morally
outrageous to the other side.'
Deutsch's effects seem to be descriptive of much lawsuit negotiating.
Much that is oppressive, inhumane or simply not moral about approaches to
negotiation is inherited from mimicking the highly adversarial, conflict ori-
ented, "litigation as warfare" style of the adjudicative process for resolving
disputes in the bargaining process.
In addition to its embrace of adversarialism as an approach, the adjudica-
tive model overemphasizes to lawyers that there are general rules of law that
will govern and resolve a particular dispute. While lawyers are provided some
substantive touchstones and departure points that lend order and a measure of
predictibility of outcome in bargaining, (if you have the good precedent, your
reservation price is higher) this aspect of the adjudicative model may obscure,
for the lawyer who reflexively follows it, the fact that effective negotiation
seeks a fair and enduring result for the disputants rather than the vindication
of a rule or law or a determination of who is right or wrong or who wins or
loses.
The adversarial aspect of our present system may militate toward a zeal-
190. See note 178 supra; see also G. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 73.
191. C. DEUTSCH, CONFLICTS: PRODUCTIVE AND DESTRUCTIVE, CONTEMPORARY
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 161 (1973).
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ousness with which lawyers, confident in their adversarial roles, exacerbate the
dispute, provoke their adversaries, and prolong the disagreement by adhering
to "legal" positions rather than by exploring meritorious solutions.
Lawyers bargain in the sometimes obscuring shadow19 of the adjudica-
tive-competitive model, often to the detriment of their clients. Lawyers are
barely able at times to distinguish the silhouettes of rational solutions that are
not law, money or win/lose oriented.
4. Cooperative Bargaining
It should be remembered that one's choice of personal approach is limited
by an overall goal or strategy. A strategy that has "settle" as its only limit will
have markedly different techniques employed in negotiation than a specific
and more demanding goal. Often a negotiator has to evaluate the psychology
of bargaining in view of the parties' relationship. If disputing parties have an
ongoing relationship that needs to be preserved, the substantial risk-taking
that is presented by the threat of trial may be out of the question. 1"3 Those
tactics that are characteristic of hard bargaining may be counterproductive if
they threaten the continued existence of the relationship. Sometimes in this
setting a lawyer may adopt an overall problem-solving attitude that is essen-
tially more gentle and cooperative. This style has sometimes been character-
ized as a "soft" negotiating approach which may be vulnerable if paired
against someone playing a "hard" bargaining game. Fisher and Ury, in their
critique of "positional bargaining" set up the ironical contrast between these
two styles of negotiating which they assert are the two choices of positional
bargaining strategies available to most people."" While the contrasts of hard
192. See Mnookin & Karnhauser, supra note 119, at 950.




The goal is agreement.
Make concessions to cultivate the
relationship.
Be soft on the people and the
problem.
Trust others.
Change your position easily.
Make offers.
Disclose your bottom line.
Accept one-sided losses to reach
agreement.




The goal is victory.
Demand concessions as a condition of
the relationship.
Be hard on the problem and the
people.
Distrust others.
Dig into your position
Make threats.
Mislead as to your bottom line.
Demand one-sided gains as the price
of agreement.
Search for the single answer: that one
you will accept.
Insist on your position.
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or soft positions is exaggerated, the comparison of stereotypic attitudes serves
to illustrate how psychological insights to negotiation may avoid stalemate or
domination.
In most settings the ultimate goal of the negotiation or the normative
values of the overall bargaining strategy should naturally mandate the choice
of bargaining psychology.
A negotiator truly mindful of the need to preserve the parties' relationship
and aware of the tendency of the hard bargaining-zero sum game toward
stalemate should be professionally cognizant of the effect bargaining psychol-
ogy may have on the ultimate resolution. In many cases where a relationship is
paramount, 195 the need to compromise will substantially outweigh the need to
win."06 When one negotiates hard, a risk results that perils the parties' rela-
tionship. If one negotiates soft, a risk of dominance by a hard bargainer may
develop unless one employs techniques that focus on the merits of the dispute,
the interests of the disputants, and the needs of all of the participants.
The cooperative approach requires a fair degree of civility and sophistica-
tion on the part of bargainers and certainly a more pronounced emphasis on
openness and trust than competitive approaches. Cooperatives have to see the
short term and relational values inherent in a problem-solving approach and
identify its characteristically open communication, trust and information shar-
ing. All techniques are directed to the resolution of a mutually recognized
problem. Cooperative problem-solving involves to some degree the following:
1. Recognizing that the resolution of the problem will be best accom-
plished by abandoning a win/lose approach.
2. Examining attitudes that promote win/lose or competitive ap-
proaches and defensiveness.
3. Changing highly adversarial or defensive behavior into a supportive
approach that allows better communications. For example, rather than judge
or evaluate-describe: "If I understand correctly, your client is concerned with
her right to continued maintenance should she find a job. My client is con-
cerned about the equity of that arrangement." Rather than: "your client's po-
sition that my client continue to pay alimony after she gets a job is
ridiculous."
4. Develop discussions on "minor" shared problems, first to develop a
Try to avoid a contest of will. Try to win a contest of will.
Yield to pressure. Apply pressure.
Disparity between the parties' strengths Large = extensive participation
Small = minor participation
Recalcitrance of client Minor = extensive participation
Extensive = minor participation
195. See Starr & Yngvesson, Scarcity and Disputing: Zeroing-in on Compro-
mise Decisions, 2 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 553, 564 (1975).
196. See Part I.(C)(2) supra.
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problem-solving momentum, rather than attempt to control what is discussed
or focus on one's strong points.
5. Rather than attempting to manipulate by various calculating bar-
gaining strategies-spontaneously brainstorm or invent solutions that might
resolve problems.
6. Empathize with the opponent's position or needs rather than ignor-
ing them. Treat the respective interests or needs of the parties as equal rather
than attempting to convince an opponent of the superiority of one's position.
7. Demonstrate a willingness to investigate issues rather than debate
positions.
8. Both sides should work together to determine the facts through
openly exchanging information rather than concealment or nondisclosure.
Facts should be mutually agreed upon, jointly discovered or connected to
outside objective criteria rather than be the subject of the negotiation. This
view of facts in the problem avoids many adversarial, emotion laden argu-
ments based on conflicting opinions as to what the facts are.
9. Develop solutions that respond to the parties' needs or interests in a
creative way. Rather than making extreme demands or outrageous offers, fo-
cus on those matters that are susceptible of resolution for mutual gain. Avoid
issues in which the success of one disputant results in loss for the other.' 9
There is no doubt "problem-solving" or "principled" negotiation is going
on in much lawyer negotiation, although we recognize much more readily the
hard and competitive psychology. Cooperative problem-solving presents an ap-
proach that avoids much of the moral tension and manipulation involved in
hard, competitive bargaining.
Often the other side will not play 08 or will attempt to exploit problem-
197. See, e.g., G. NIERENBERG, supra note 84, at 188. Fisher and Ury offer an
excellent problem-solving program, which they call "principled bargaining." The steps
are:
1. Separate the people from the problem. The participants are prob-
lem solvers. The goal of the negotiation is a wise outcome reached efficiently
and amicably. Be soft on the people, hard on the merits. Focusing on the
merits avoids issues of trust or distrust inherent in hard or soft bargaining.
2. Focus on the parties' interests not positions. Explore interests
without fixing on a positional or bottom line approach.
3. Invent options for mutual gain. Develop multiple options to chose
from for discussion, decide the most acceptable solution later.
4. Insist on objective criteria. Try to reach a decision based on stan-
dards independent of will. Reason and be open to reasons, yielding only to
principle not pressure.
5. Develop A Best Alternative To A Negotiated Settlement.
(BATNA) Plan what will be done if negotiations breakdown.
R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 7.
198. R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 7, at 113-47. They suggest, without being
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solving behavior. A problem-solving, cooperative or principled approach cannot
restructure a zero sum contest or a clear clash of disputants' needs or interests.
And as Bellow and Moulton point out: "[T]he research that has been done on
the subject, though inconclusive, suggests that initial overtures of cooperation
may not be trusted or reciprocated unless they have been preceded by an ini-
tial period of uncooperativeness and pressure."' " This phenomenon may be
the result of a basic instinct to first lower the other side's expectations, or a
function of simple prejudice about the combative nature of negotiation.
The effective bargainer cannot elect an either/or approach without sacri-
ficing in some cases a client's interests. Like the complementary learning and
persuasion modes in communication, an approach that is designed to be flex-
ible, to synthesize concepts rather than adhere to a negotiating dogma, will
best serve lawyers' morals, clients' needs and best attend the psychological
hurdles in negotiation.
5. Responding to Psychological Ploys
Often strategic ploys or tactics may be employed to gain psychological
advantage. A common rationale is that the negotiating technique, device or
ploy is used to soften up the opponent, lower his expectation, make him un-
comfortable in some cases, or at a minimum make him more psychologically
amenable to settlement. 200 Many so-called negotiation tactics involve nothing
wholly convincing, that there are ways of making hard bargainers cooperative. See id.
ch. 7 ("What If They Won't Play? (Use Negotiation Jujitsu)"); id. ch. 8 ("What If
They Use Dirty Tricks? (Taming the Had Bargainer)").
199. G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, NEGOTIATION HANDBOOK-THE LAWYERING
PROCESS 156 (1981); see also H. RAIFFA, supra note 32, at 50 (Raiffa corroborates
Bellow & Moultons statement in his classroom experiments).
200. See generally J. HARTJE & M. WILSON, supra note 86, ch. 7, (tactical
ploys and strategic behavior). Some of the common tactics employed in negotiation are:
A. Timing Tactics
1. The Last Bite Tactic. A negotiator seeks the accommodation of "one
last matter" after the agreement has been completed. The bargainer is al-
ready mentally wining and dining in celebration of the compromise. Any ad-
ditional demand seems consistent with agreement. The critical and objective
ability to evaluate the client's or parties' best interest is clouded.
2. Splitting the Difference. One often hears the offer to split the differ-
ence during the concluding stages in a negotiation. Most negotiators know
that splitting the difference is only effective when it is consciously used in
conjunction with preceding offers and demands and, at a time when the split
is favorable.
3. The Preemptive Strike or Fait Accompli. This tactic involves
presenting the other side with an accomplished fact which achieves a goal in
the negotiation and then sitting back to see what they will do about it. It is
clearly an illegitimate bargaining tactic. It takes an item for discussion and
compromise off the bargaining table to serve the advantage of one of the other
1984]
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more than mispresentations and the application of improper pressure which
of the disputants. When faced with the fait accompli, it is often useful to
proceed with the negotiation as if it had not taken place, or assume that the
act taken by the other side can be undone or will be undone as a contingent
part of the final agreement.
4. One Shot Bargaining-The One Fair Offer Or Demand. Like the
preemptive strike, this approach, sometimes called boulwareism, seems
outside our normal understanding of the give and take phenomenon in bar-
gaining. It was prohibited as an "unfair practice" in labor negotiations. The
major drawback to the one firm and fair offer or demand is that no one be-
lieves it. See supra note 180.
5. The Deadline. It is common in negotiations that real or arbitrarily
imposed time deadlines impose a result that favors one party. Arbitrary time
deadlines are susceptible to verification as any other factual assertion in nego-
tiation: "Why is it necessary that I respond to your offer within five days?"
No good reason exists why one should be restricted by a time deadline, arbi-
trarily imposed, unless it suits a particular negotiating goal.
B. Authority Tactics
Another group of tactics depends upon the bargainer's relationship to his
principal and representations concerning the negotiator's authority. There
seem to be two common variants of the use of authority or failure of authority
as a tactic to gain advantage in a negotiation:
I. "The Mad Dog Client." The negotiator remains extremely agreea-
ble, understanding and immune to the most persuasive arguments or creative
solutions of his adversary because his client is a "mad dog" on this issue and
simply would not agree. This allows the negotiator who uses it the security of
never having to concede a thing on behalf of his aggressively demented client.
In a negotiation so structured, movement toward compromise can come about
only if the other side concedes.
2. No Authority. This involves giving the negotiator limited authority
or tying him down to detailed instructions beyond which he may not travel.
The standard climax in a "no authority" negotiation is when the agent dis-
closes that he is absolutely happy with the agreement that has been worked
out but that he has to report to his client to get the ultimate approval.
3. Alliance. Many times negotiators will use their client's association
with an authority figure or an investigative authority as a bargaining tactic.
"The Attorney General's Office is extremely interested in this action and is
going to join as a party should this matter be litigated." The technique is
sometimes called "association and alliance." It depends on the obvious psy-
chological pressure that is applied by enlisting the participation and clout rep-
resented in a state or federal agency, or any ally having substantial power and
prestige. The effectiveness of the technique depends on the reflected power of
"the authority" and the dispiriting effect of being up against large numbers
and significant resources.
C. Communication Tactics
1. Trollope Ploy. Another set of tactics involve the negotiator's ap-
proach to communications in the bargaining. One approach is called the "trol-
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has nothing to do with the merits of the dispute. A response that seeks verifi-
lope ploy." When one bargainer communicates two messages, the tactic in-
volves accepting and working with the message that one thinks is most
advantageous and ignoring the other. A common example is the offer from an
insurance adjuster to settle a car accident case for $6,000 to $8,000. The
offer, of course, is $8,000.
2. Misdirection. Other communication tactics involve use of misdirec-
tion. Often negotiators will stress matters that are niggling or unimportant in
the negotiation in order to cover up or divert, attention from matters of sub-
stance or importance. Delaying an answer to a specific question or suspension
of discussion of an issue until later or convening a caucus or a recess to con-
sider a matter are all examples of a negotiation ploy called patience or for-
bearance. The tactic is designed to take the play and the negotiating momen-
tum away from the other side and delay or avoid the discussion of their issues
while focusing on the discussion of other issues.
D. Pressure Tactics
In any survey of common negotiating tactics, there is one group of ploys
that deserves special mention-personal pressure tactics. There are lawyers
who feel that it is appropriate in the zealous representation of their clients to
make it personally hard on the other lawyer in the negotiation process. The
goal is to psychologically wear down or soften up the opposition, so that con-
cessions are made or bargains are struck partially in response to the negotia-
tor's discomfiture. The principled negotiator should be sensitive to the non-
meritorious or unethical approaches or tricks that are unfortunately often
played by other lawyer-negotiators.
I. Physcial discomfort. If one finds oneself negotiating, at the other
side's office, sitting staring into the sun, in a chair that is three inches lower
than all the other chairs in a room in which the temperature has been turned
up to 90 degrees, one might suspect that the other side is using tactics
designed to cause physical discomfort. Similar motives generate the kind of
personal denegration or nonmeritorious attacks on one's client or oneself.
Those who use such tactics care little for the niceties of professional decorum
and are prepared to use reprehensible means to achieve their negotiating
goals.
2. Threats. The use of the threat is one of the most talked about tactics
in negotiation literature. A threat to go to trial, to withdraw an offer, to im-
pose an arbitrary deadline, to call in the newspapers to publicize the matter,
all involve pressure. The result of the pressure is hoped to cause a yielding, a
retreat on positions or a desire to conclude negotiations promptly and gener-
ally to one's disadvantage. Every negotiation involves some implicit threats.
The threat of deadlock, the threat of delay, the threat ultimately of trial with
risky and potentially inequitable results, are all incidents of the normal law-
suit negotiation. However, the threat as a tactic of potential pressure is much
used and abused in negotiations. Threats may, like a number of manipulative
tactics, cause resistance and anger that ultimately will be counterproductive
and interfere with the negotiation process.
3. "Mutt and Jeff." In team negotiation the "Mutt and Jeff" or "good
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cation of assertions or applies outside objective standards generally can elimi-
nate the potential for deception. In the case of attempted pressure tactics an
insistance that the bargaining stick to merits usually nullifies such approaches.
Often simply recognizing a tactic is enough to disarm it. Fisher and Ury
suggest:
After recognizing the tactic, bring it up with the other side.
"Say, Joe, I may be totally mistaken, but I am getting the feeling that
you and Ted here are playing a good-guy/bad-guy routine. If you two want a
recess anytime to straighten out differences between you, just ask."
Discussing the tactic not only makes it less effective, it may cause the
other side to worry about alienating you completely, simply raising a question
about a tactic may be enough to get them to stop using it. 01
Any response in negotiating, whether it is a reaction to a manipulative
tactic that has been recognized or a genuine rejoinder to an offer, should con-
centrate on the merits of the problem: [in response to a threat] "I am aware of
the consequences if I fail to concede on the point you just raised. However, I
think a solution to the problem is to resolve the issues here to our mutual
satisfaction."
An alternative approach is to simply ignore the tactic, to allow a situation
where the other side can "save face." One should search for ways to demon-
strate to the other negotiator who has taken some position as a tactical ploy,
that the desired revision of her position is consistent with the principles es-
guy, bad guy" tactic is sometimes seen. One of the team is friendly and the
other is nasty or the team appears to have an internal conflict concerning its
bargaining position. The technique is so notorious that it is easily recognized
and has, or should have, very little effect. The goal of the tactic is to manipu-
late the adversary so that he takes the marginal concessions granted by the
"soft liner" because they are vastly superior to what is offered by the "hard
liner."
4. Lock-In or Precondition Tactics. A lock-in tactic is similar to the
"take it or leave it" approach of Boulwareism, but the position taken is
locked-in either by publicity or some form of inexorable commitment so that
it is clear that one cannot be moved from the position without considerable
loss of face.
Similarly, the use of a precondition to negotiation is simply a demand for
an immediate concession as the carrot to keep the bargaining continuing.
Both approaches are gambles and are contradictions where there has been an
earlier agreement to negotiate. These tactics, like a number of those cata-
logued here, are inimical to the spirit of negotiation. Each places severe pres-
sure on the good faith negotiator who seeks communication and discussion in
order to solve the impasse in the case.
5. Outnumbering. Occasionally lawyers will attempt to outnumber the
other side in order to dominate the agenda and to psychologically, if not liter-
ally, overwhelm the opposition. Id.
201. R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 7, at 136.
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poused by her prior commitments or the entire goal of the negotiation. Where
a "tactical position" has been abandoned in favor of an approach on the merits
the careful bargainer should minimize the shift in his opponent's position in
order to cushion the impact of losing face as a result of deserting a position
earlier announced as "final." When responding to a proposal embodied in a
specific tactic it may be useful to keep the discussion flowing by treating it as
an available alternative, unless it is too bizarre or illegitimate. Analyze the
position represented by the tactical statement from the perspective of the in-
terests of the disputants. If the tactical position or ploy is ludicrous, that will
become apparent without any characterizing being done. Take the tactical as-
sertion, modify it and build upon it so that it becomes a subject that can be
successfully discussed rather than merely asserted as a position.
A tactic that is unconnected with any meritorious claim or any issue of
substance must not influence the bargaining. The tactic must be ignored or
nullified or the other side will be encouraged to continue to approach bargain-
ing in that ritualized and willful way.
D. Ethics in Negotiation-Is There Ethical Deception?
It can be seen that the process of negotiating on behalf of a client may be
a manipulative and a duplicitous endeavor which strains the professional con-
science and individual morality. In a profession in which the first precept of
professional responsibility was a "high-toned morality," negotiation can pro-
vide a stringent test. In one of the original statements dealing with the duties
of a lawyer in his relationship to the public, the court, the profession and the
client, the leading statement was as follows: "There is perhaps no profession
after that of the sacred ministry, in which a high-toned morality is more im-
peratively necessary than that of the law."2 2 Yet we know that our friends
and our neighbors view the legal profession as one in which a lawyer will stoop
to virtually any trickery on behalf of clients.
This image of lawyers has persisted over the centuries. Is it because the
nonlawyer public is jealous of the lawyer's association with power, prestige
and money? Or is it because lawyers feel in most of their work that they are
entitled, like Metternich, to depend on cunning, calculation, and a willingness
to employ whatever means justify the end of the client's objectives? This view
may be supported by what we know about lawyer's ethics in negotiation. We
know there is deception. Can it be justified? Does it serve a larger purpose
than client or lawyer avarice or need to "win."
Let us examine the following situation. You have met with your client in
a serious personal injury matter. You have prepared the case thoroughly and
have discussed with the client your evaluation of the case and the client's goals
202. G. CHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 55 (1876), cited in
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and needs. You have agreed that you will not settle the case for less than
$80,000. The next day your telephone rings. It is the insurance adjuster that
you have been dealing with on the case. After ritualized justifications and pos-
turing, he surprisingly offers $90,000 to settle the case. What should you do?
A number of approaches are available.
Most lawyers will have no difficulty in stating to the adjuster immediately
that "My client will not take a penny less than $100,000 period in this situa-
tion," or "Gee whiz Bob, I do not have any authority to settle at this point.
That sounds a little low. Let me talk to the client and get back to you." An-
other option is: "Let me convey that to the client and get back to you." In the
latter setting the lawyer would consult again with the client. The client would
be advised that since $90,000 is the first offer, the adjuster, according to nego-
tiating lore, is bound to come up. The first offer cannot be believed, therefore,
they should be able to get more than $90,000 from the adjuster. All of the
responses that seek more than $90,000 are premised on the lack of credibility
of the first offer. They are also founded upon the notion in the literature of
lawyers professional responsibility that failing to take full lawful advantage of
one's adversary may be unethical.'"
Fidelity to the client is a highly salutory objective in most legal represen-
tation, but in many respects in negotiation, adherence to the client's needs
provides the ethical underpinning as well as the articulated reason for ques-
tionable lawyer conduct-misrepresentation and distortion of information. The
conduct that goes on in most negotiation is justified by lawyers on the basis
that all lawyers understand what is going on. In virtually every statement of
position lawyers are merely "puffing" like car salesmen, and any false state-
ment or misrepresentations in negotiation are to be understood as puffing and
discounted.
In a perceptive discussion, Judge Alvin Rubin has put his finger on the
conventional ethical wisdom in negotiation:
To most practitioners it appears that anything sanctioned by the rules of
the game is appropriate. From this point of view, negotiations are merely, as
social scientists have viewed it, a form of game; observance of the expected
rules, not professional ethics, is the guiding precept. But gamesmanship is not
ethics.2"
The existing Code of Professional Responsibility does not shed much light
on the ethical difficulties in the area of lawsuit negotiating. In summary, the
Code provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly make false statements of the
law. He must not involve himself in the creation or preservation of evidence
when he knows, or it is obvious that the evidence is false. He must not counsel
or assist his client in conduct that he knows to be illegal or fraudulent, or
knowingly engage himself in other illegal conduct or conduct contrary to disci-
203. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(l)-(3)
(1979).
204. Rubin, supra note 202, at 586.
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plinary rule or to conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is re-
quired by law to reveal.206 The lawyer is urged to treat with consideration all
persons involved in the legal process and avoid infliction of needless harm. He
or she should be temperate and dignified, and refrain from all illegal and mor-
ally reprehensible conduct.2
0 6
Most of these prescriptions deal directly with the preparation or presenta-
tion of testimony or evidence in court and apply only tangentially to the nego-
tiation context. The ethical considerations in two respects deal more directly
with settlement negotiations. The Code provides that clients must approve all
settlements, 07 and that lawyers disclose potentially conflicting interests in a
bargaining setting.208
The absence of guidance in the ethical literature has perhaps led to the
moral ambiguity in negotiations and development of the rule of intelligently
informed gamesmanship described earlier. For most lawyers the conventions in
negotiation practice do not rise to the level of moral reprehensibility that could
mandate a less manipulative approach to bargaining.
The duties owed to the client, albeit commendable, often inhibit deeper
penetration of the moral issues in negotiation. An early look at the problem
emphasized that the lawyer "is an instrument for the furtherance of justice
and is under no obligation to aid his client in obtaining an unconscionable
advantage. Of course, in the zone of doubt an attorney may and probably
should get all possible for his client."
209
The problem is and has been that the zone of doubt is virtually all encom-
passing. The zone of doubt theory suggests that in the hypothetical discussed
above that to maximize the client's situation, the lawyer may be justified in
flatly rejecting the first offer of $90,000 and to seek more, knowing or surmis-
ing that the first offer is not the adjuster's bottom line, without even consulting
with his client as to that course of action. This response is justified by the
rationale of maximization of the client's interest.
Judge Rubin in a stirring effort attempted to narrow the zone of doubt
and to redefine the issues in the ethics of negotiations:
[The lawyer] is enjoined to point out to his client, "those factors that may
lead to a decision that is morally just." Whether a mode of conduct available
to the lawyer is illegal or merely unconscionably unfair, the attorney must
refuse to participate. This duty of fairness is one owed to the profession and to
society; it must supercede any duty owed to the client.
• ..Client avarice and hostility neither control the lawyer's conscience
205. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(3), (5)-(8)
(1979).
206. Id. EC 7-27, 7-10, 7-9.
207. Id. EC 7-7.
208. Id. EC 5-16, 5-17.
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nor measure his ethics. Surely if its practitioners are principled, a profession
that dominates the legal process in our law-oriented society would not expect
too much if it required its members to adhere to two simple principles when
they negotiate as professionals: negotiate honestly and in good faith; and do
not take unfair advantage of another-regardless of his relative expertise or
sophistication."'
In evaluating the precepts proposed by Judge Rubin the question is posed,
as in the matchup of the hard and soft bargainer-"What will happen when
the 'idealistic' lawyer who conducts himself the way Judge Rubin suggests is
pitted against the unscrupulous and dishonorable adversary?" The image is
one of Billy Budd contesting against Darth Vader: the high road should be
avoided because some will take advantage. Yet such mismatches exist con-
stantly in present practice and are condoned and rationalized. The oral history
of legal negotiation is filled with tales of the young lawyer taken in by the
experienced guileful veteran who is simply operating under the existing rules
of the game. It has been suggested that a remedial response to such mismatch-
es "would discourage lawyers from striving for excellence and would ulti-
mately be a detriment to the legal profession." ''1 The next time the youngster
will know better.
Recognizing the need for some standards in legal negotiation and in an
attempt to develop a broader normative approach, in 1980 the ABA Commis-
sion on Evaluation of Professional Standards elaborated not only a number of
guiding principles for the negotiator but specific responses in a negotiation
setting. 212
210. Rubin, supra note 202, at 593-94 (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1979)).
211. N. JACKER, NEGOTIATION TECHNIQUES, AN OVERVIEW L-105 (1982)
(CLE Material from Washington State Bar Association).
212. E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 4 introduction
(Discussion Draft 1980):
As negotiator, a lawyer should consider not only the client's short-run advan-
tage but also his or her long-run interests, such as the state of future relations
between the parties. The lawyer should help the client appreciate the interests
and postion of the other party and should encourage concessions that will
effectuate the client's larger objectives. A lawyer shold not transform a bar-
gaining situation into a demonstration of toughness or hypertechnicality or
forget that the purely legal aspects of an agreement are often subordinate to
its practical aspects. When the alternative to reaching agreement is likely to
be litigation, the lawyer should be aware that, although litigation is wholly
legitimate as a means of resolving controversy, a fairly negotiated settlement
generally yields a better conclusion. A lawyer should also recognize that the
lawyer's own interest in resorting to litigation may be different from a client's
interest in doing so.
A lawyer's style in negotiations can have great influence on the character
of the negotiations-whether they are restrained, open, and business-like, or
acrimonious and permeated with distrust. Whatever their outcome, negotia-
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The draft rules required specifically that the client be informed of all set-
tlement communications and that the lawyer take particular responsibility to
see that acceptance of a settlement be a product of the client's judgment. 218
tions should be conducted in a civil and forthright manner. Nevertheless, it
must be recognized that in negotiations a lawyer is the agent for the client
and not an arbitrator or mediator. Negotiation is in part a competition for
advantage between parties who have the legal competence to settle their own
affairs. A lawyer as negotiator should not impose an agreement on the client,
even if the lawyer believes the agreement is in the client's best interests. By
the same token, a lawyer does not necessarily endorse the substance of an
agreement arrived at through his or her efforts.
213.
Id. Rule 4.1 provided:
A lawyer conducting negotiations for a client shall:
(a) Inform the client of facts relevant to the matter and of communica-
tions from another party that may significantly affect resolution of the matter;
(b) In connection with an offer, take reasonable steps to assure that the
judgment of the client rather than that of the lawyer determines whether the
offer will be accepted.
Id. comment provided:
A lawyer should conduct negotiations with a view to maximizing the in-
terest of the client. Ordinarily the interests of client and lawyer are harmoni-
ous in that a resolution advantageous to the client is correspondingly advanta-
geous to the lawyer. However, the interests of lawyer and client can diverge.
For example, in contingent fee litigation a substantial offer may be forthcom-
ing before the lawyer has invested much effort in preparation of the case; at
that point it may be in the lawyer's interest to accept the offer, while it might
be in the client's interest to have the case more fully developed as a means of
provoking a larger offer. Conversely, a lawyer compensated on an hourly basis
has an interest in full preparation of a case apart from settlement. So also, a
lawyer's interest in maintaining a reputation as a hard bargainer may lead the
lawyer to disparage a proposal that the client might welcome as an end to an
irksome controversy.
In some circumstances, variance between the lawyer's and the client's
interest is unavoidable. The lawyer should present such divergence of interest
to the client as openly and as objectively as possible. A lawyer who withholds
a serious offer from an opposing party, or fails to disclose how it might affect
the lawyer's own interest, in effect assumes a proprietary position in the trans-
action to the detriment of the client. Information about such an offer cannot
be withheld because the lawyer believes accepting the offer would not be in
the client's best interests; that is a matter for the client to decide. See Rules
1.3 and 1.4.
A lawyer should assume other lawyers will comply with the obligations
imposed by this Rule. It is therefore inappropriate to circumvent opposing
counsel in order to present facts or communicate an offer directly to the other
party, for doing so undermines the negotiator's function. A lawyer's refusal to
communicate an offer or position is a violation of a duty not only to the law-
yer's client but also to the party who submitted the offer. In transmitting an
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Draft Rule 4.2 made plain that fairness and above board dealing was the ex-
pected touchstone of negotiation: misrepresentations and failure to disclose
certain material facts were prohibited. Draft Rule 4.2(b) stated:
A lawyer shall not make a knowing misrepresentation of fact or law, or
fail to disclose a material fact known to the lawyer, even if adverse, when
disclosure is:
(1) Required by law or the Rules of Professional Conduct; or
(2) Necessary to correct a manifest misapprehension of fact or law re-
sulting from a previous representation made by the lawyer or known by the
lawyer to have been made by the client, except that counsel for an accused in
a criminal case is not required to make such a correction when it would re-
quire disclosing a misrepresentation made by the accused."",
offer to the lawyer for another party, reference can be made to this obligation.
If it appears that the opposing lawyer persists in refusing to transmit the of-
fer, complaint may properly be made to the appropriate disciplinary author-
ity; if the negotiation is conducted in the context of litigation, it is proper to
inform the court.
(Citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7; DR 7-104 (1979);
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 326 (1970).
214. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2(b) (Discussion Draft
1980). The remainder of the rule read:
(a) In conducting negotiations a lawyer shall be fair in dealing with
other participants.
(c) A lawyer shall not: (1) Engage in the pretense of negotiating with
no substantial purpose other than to delay or burden another party; (2) Ille-
gally obstruct another party's rightful access to information relevant to the
matter in negotiation; (3) Communicate directly with another party who the
lawyer knows is represented by other counsel, except with the consent of the
party's counsel or as authorized by law.
Id. comment provided:
Fairness in negotiation implies that representations by or in behalf of one
party to the other party be truthful. This requirement is reflected in contract
law, particularly the rules relating to fraud and mistake. A lawyer involved in
negotiations has an obligation to assure as far as practicable that the negotia-
tions conform to the law's requirements in this regard.
Under the usually accepted conventions of negotiation, the parties have
only limited duties of disclosure to each other. Generally, a party is not re-
quired to apprise another party of background facts or collateral opportunities
for gain that may accrue as a result of a transaction between them. Facts that
must be disclosed do not include estimates of price or value that a party
places on the subject of a transaction, or a party's intentions as to an accept-
able settlement of a claim, or the existence of an undisclosed principal except
where nondisclosure would constitute fraud. A party is permitted to suggest
advantages to an opposing party that may be insubstantial from an objective
point of view. The precise contours of the legal duties concerning disclosure,
representation, puffery, overreaching, and other aspects of honesty in negotia-
tions cannot be concisely stated. They have changed over time and vary ac-
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Draft Rule 4.3 required lawyers to look to the substance of an agreement to
cording to circumstances. They also can vary according to the parties' famili-
arity with transactions of the kind involved. Thus, the modern law of
commercial transactions places duties of disclosure on sellers that go well be-
yond the classic rule of caveat emptor, and modern securities transactions
often must conform to elaborate disclosure rules. It is a lawyer's responsibility
to see that negotiations conducted by the lawyer conform to applicable legal
standards, whatever they may be.
In negotiation as in litigation, a lawyer generally has no duty to inform
an opposite party of relevant facts and circumstances. However, it is the law-
yer's duty to be forthcoming when the lawyer or the client has misled another
party with respect to a matter of fact or law, for in such circumstances the
failure to act is the equivalent of actively misleading the other party. A law-
yer should not induce a belief that the lawyer is disinterested in a matter
when in fact he or she represents a client.
Whether there should be a further burden of disclosure on a lawyer has
long been a matter of some controversy. Canon 41 of the Canons of Ethics
required, in general terms, that "when a lawyer discovers that some fraud or
deception has been practiced, he should endeavor to rectify it," if necessary
by undertaking to "inform the injured person or his counsel." A more limited
requirement was imposed by DR 7-102(B) of the ABA Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility. The competing considerations are clear but difficult
to resolve. A lawyer could properly be regarded as having a professional re-
sponsibility to see that negotiations under his or her auspices are informed on
all sides. However, to make a lawyer responsible for an opposing party's infor-
mation about the matter in negotiation exposes the lawyer to charges of mis-
feasance that can be easily contrived, and exposes the transaction to addi-
tional risk of being legally avoided on the ground of mistake. The likelihood
of these consequences is especially severe when the facts concerning the mat-
ter in negotiation are inherently uncertain or complex, or . . . [where] there
is substantial discrepancy between parties' access to information about the
matter. Counsel for the accused in a criminal case is subject to constraint
against disclosing during negotiations facts that might incriminate the client.
See also Rule 1.7.
Negotiation is ordinarily a voluntary process. The parties usually deter-
mine the agenda and procedure of negotiation, without the constraint of ex-
ternally imposed rules or an external authority, such as a judge, to enforce
them. The principal sanction supporting standards of decorum and fairness is
that of breaking off negotiations, although in some situations, such as collec-
tive bargaining, there may also be legal sanctions to compel bargaining.
There are, however, limitations that should be observed by a lawyer in
conducting negotiations. As an aspect of the duty to deal fairly with other
parties, a lawyer should not engage in the pretense of negotiation when the
client has no real intention of seeking agreement. In particular, it is dishonest
to pretend to negotiate when the real purpose is to prevent the other party
from pursuing an alternative course of action. More generally, a lawyer acting
as negotiator should recognize that maintaining a fair and courteous tenor in
negotiation can contribute to a satisfactory resolution. This is particularly
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prevent a fraudulent, illegal or unconscionable result-if not to guarantee sub-
stantive fairness.21 5
true when the parties to the negotiation have a continuing relationship with
each other, as in collective bargaining or in negotiations between divorcing
parents concerning child custody. An agreement that is the product of open,
forbearing, and fair-minded negotiation can be a demonstration by the law-
yers of the conduct that the parties themselves should display toward each
other.
(Citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-10; DR 7-O1(A)(1), 7-
102, 7-104 (1979); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op.
337 (1974); Leubsdorf, Communications with Another Lawyer's Client, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 683 (1979); Rubin, supra note 577; Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 1113 (1965)).
215. MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.3 (Discussion Draft
1980) provided: "A lawyer shall not conclude an agreement, or assist a client in con-
cluding an agreement, that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is illegal, con-
tains legally prohibited terms, would work a fraud, or would be held to be unconsciona-
ble as a matter of law."
Id. comment provided:
Although a lawyer is generally not responsible for the substantive fair-
ness of the result of a negotiation, the lawyer has a duty to see that the prod-
uct is not offensive to the law. There are many legal proscriptions concerning
contractual arrangements. Being a party to some types of agreement is a pe-
nal offense. Some types of contractual provisions are prohibited by law, such
as provisions purporting to waive certain legally conferred rights. Modern
commercial law provides that grossly unfair contracts are unconscionable and
may therefore be invalid. Such proscriptions are intended to secure definite
legal rights. As an officer of the legal system, a lawyer is required to observe
them. On the other hand, there are legal rules that simply make certain con-
tractual provisions unenforeceable, allowing one or both parties to avoid the
obligation. Inclusion of such provisions in a contract may be unwise but it is
not ethically improper, nor is it improper to include a provision whose legality
is subject to reasonable argument.
A lawyer is not obliged to make an independent investigation of the cir-
cumstances of a transaction to assure that it is legally unimpeachable. Gener-
ally speaking, the lawyer is only obliged to act upon the basis of matters that
the lawyer actually knows or reasonably should be expected to know in the
circumstances, and upon reasonable suppositions about the resolution of
doubtful questions of law. However, in certain situations the lawyer may be
legally required to make a particular investigation or determination with re-
gard to the regularity of a transaction; if so, the lawyer is bound by the pre-
scribed standard of conduct. Moreover, a lawyer is not absolved of responsi-
bility for a legally offensive transaction simply because the client takes the
final step in carrying it out. For example, a lawyer who prepares a form con-
tract containing legally proscribed terms is involved in a transaction in which
the form is used, even though the lawyer does not participate in a specific
transaction.
A transaction that works a fraud on another person is proscribed by law,
and a lawyer should not be involved in such a transaction. This principle ap-
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While the commission draft did not make radical proposals, the spotlight
was placed on specific lawyer conduct in negotiation and the tenor of the com-
ments was clearly consistent with the concerns articulated by Judge Rubin.' 6
It is ironic to note that the specific approach taken to negotiation by the
Commission draft was abandoned by the ABA delegates, the lawyers them-
selves, for a business as usual approach. Rule 4.1 as adopted by the ABA
provides:
In the course of representing a client, a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a)
make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or (b) fail to
disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid
assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohib-
ited by Rule 1.6.217
The adopted rule and the comments can clearly be viewed as a step back-
ward from the aspirations of Judge Rubin and the Commission drafters of the
model rule. The informed gamesman or the car salesman puffing rule is codi-
fied, although with some parameters. The comment to the rule in effect
charges:
(1) Do not believe in statements of price or value,
(2) Do not believe statements regarding the parties' intention as to
whether or not a settlement figure is acceptable, and
(3) A lawyer does not have to disclose his principle unless failure to
disclose would be fraud.
It is hoped that the enlightened guidance of the draft version of the rules
plies whether the defrauded party is a party to the transaction or not. Hence,
a lawyer should not participate in a sham transaction whose purpose is to
interfere with an obligation to a third party: a conveyance in fraud of credi-
tors, for example, or a transaction involving tax evasion.
(Citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(7), (8) (1979)).
216. The references to Draft Rule 4.2 cited Judge Rubin's article, supra note
202.
217. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1 (ABA Adopted Draft
1983). Id. comment provides:
A lawyer is required to be truthful when dealing with others on a client's
behalf, but generally has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of
relevant facts. A misrepresentation can occur if the lawyer incorporates or
affirms a statement of another person that the lawyer knows is false. Misrep-
resentations can also occur by failure to act.
This Rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a particular statement
should be regarded as one of fact can depend on the circumstances. Under
generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements or-
dinarily are not taken as statements of material fact. Estimates of price or
value placed on the subject of a transaction and a party's intentions as to an
acceptable settlement of a claim are in this category, and so is the existence
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rather than the modest and somewhat jaded approach ultimately adopted will
reach into lawyers' work in negotiation. It does not seem an extraordinary
expectation to require truth and honor, if not full disclosure, as watchwords of
our dealings with one another rather than the shifting morality of the used car
lot. Each lawyer will have to reckon with the demands of clients to manipulate
or deceive other lawyers and their own needs to manipulate clients for their
own ends or the client's "best interests." Each lawyer will need to assess the
extent to which the demands and expectations of the profession and clients will
erode established moral positions. Negotiation is not a game but a serious and
consequential endeavor for the benefit of clients and our system of justice. The
gap between what is tolerated aid what should be practiced is:
The difference between the true lawyer and those men who consider the law
merely a trade is that the latter seek to find ways to permit their clients to
violate the moral standards of society without overstepping the letter of the
law, while the former look for principles which will persuade their clients to
keep within the limits of the spirit of the law in common moral standards.""
E. Lawyer Skills in Closing the Agreement
During the final negotiation stages statements such as "this is my best
offer" or "we cannot agree to that amount" are much more definitive than
when made earlier in the bargaining.21 As the negotiation progresses, it is
important for the negotiators at all times to know where they are precisely in
the exchange of information and the solution to problems on substantive
issues.
Negotiators should regularly review what has already been agreed upon
and assess progress on the remaining issues under consideration. This review
and progress assessment not only procedurally nails down slippery or difficult
areas of agreement, it is psychologically motivating to the negotiators. The
parties can see generally that significant inroads have been made toward com-
promise, perhaps even on the most knotty of issues. The review of the remain-
ing issues allows the negotiating parties to make a realistic comparison as to
how far they have come in the negotiation. This exercise is not only sound
organizationally but useful from an emotional standpoint as well.
A periodic progress assessment will eliminate the likelihood of issues or
concerns slipping through cracks later to reemerge and confound the seeking
of closure.
When a final agreement is reached, the agreement should be specifically
reviewed in all its detail prior to any discussion of drafting a settlement agree-
ment. A conventional wisdom in negotiating is that one should seek to draft
the final agreement so that if any ambiguity exists in the substance of the
218. P. CALAMANDREI, EULOGY OF JUDGES 62 (1942) quoted in Rubin, supra
note 204, at 587.
219. See P. GULLIVER, supra note 33, at 84.
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parties' agreements one can resolve that ambiguity in favor of one's client in
the written agreement. There should be no ambiguity when the written agree-
ment is memorialized.
There are dangers inherent in the insistence on specific detailed agree-
ments on all issues. It often develops that parties will agree in a general way
about a detail but when that detail becomes more and more concrete and spe-
cific, the early agreement will break down. A difficulty in closing the agree-
ment is caused by ignoring important details in the final product. Negotiators
are tempted to look at a detail and if it is of an exacerbating nature, avoid
dealing with it directly. A bypassing approach at the closing stage of negotia-
tion can create later party dissatisfaction that causes disputing after the dis-
pute was thought settled. Unsettled issues are ticking time bombs that will
explode later to destroy the agreement. Although the effort involved in specifi-
cally working out the detail at the closing of the settlement may be arduous, it
is better that the painstaking work be done during the negotiating process than
risk the agreement be jettisoned because of dissatisfaction on the part of the
parties. This effort is rewarded later in the drafting process in which the law-
yer is attempting to crystallize and make predictable the completed meeting of
the minds.
There is a feeling at the making of a negotiated settlement that once an
agreement is reached verbally, emotionally or psychologically, the dispute is
over. This reaction can be very misleading. A crucial part of the negotiating
process is the skillful memorializing of the specific agreement of the parties so
that it can serve a useful function for them.2 °
The drafter must first understand the operational function of the writing.
If the agreement is to guide future conduct and establish a "legal" relation-
ship, the doctrinal area should be carefully researched and made a subject of
reference-statutes, treatises and other sources. The agreement should be
drafted as specifically as possible and each issue dealt with in a specific fash-
ion. Any areas of complexity should be defined.
If the agreement is to be commonly worked with by lay parties, it should
be carefully crafted to avoid "legalese", jargon or archaic uses. The drafter
should avoid vague and overbroad language when defining the prescribed con-
duct of parties, conditions, substance or procedure.
III. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper is to suggest and highlight the unseen lawyer
skills involved in the operation of negotiation. The extent to which lawyers
understand the discrete application of common operational skills to each stage
of the bargaining process may be crucial to the continuing exploration of nego-
tiation as a central form of private dispute resolution.
220. See Rutter, supra note 4, at 338.
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.Figure 15. Plaintifrs decision tree for the last stage of pretrial negotiations. (Costs are in
thousands of dollars.)
From H. Raiffa, The An and Science of Negotiation, p. 74.
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